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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1969, when I first began writing about zoning, the world was
ideologically a much different place than it is now. Governments then
presiding over most of the world's population condemned the protection
of private property as both evil and stupid. They extolled government
ownership and planning as essential to economic welfare and development.
The market, they insisted, was irrational and unfair; experts must control
it in the public interest. Communist govemments adopted every conceivable
law to accomplish this objective but instead achieved economic and
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. He
presented the initial draft of this Article at the 2000 Annual Convention of the American
Institute of Architects in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

political disaster.
Well, things sure have changed. Almost all of the former communist
governments have reversed their positions and have ratified constitutions
guaranteeing the ownership of private property. In the older capitalist
countries, relatively few office holders currently support nationalizing
industry; instead, the emphasis is now on privatization, which can only
be achieved by limiting government powers.
The great lesson of our time is that the forces of production,
conservation, and creativity exist principally in the marketplace and not
in government. To be sure, private entrepreneurs act largely in their own
self-interest, but probably no more so than government officials, and
their endeavors in the economic area are much more beneficial to the
public.
The difference between a market economy and a command economy
is enormous. In the communist and socialist societies, progress in every
sector depends on the competence and skills of a very small group of
people appointed by the government. Multiply that number by hundreds
or thousands to understand the operation of a free system. The incentives of
wealth and fame motivate great numbers of people to innovate and
produce services and products that will enlarge the public's welfare and
comfort. Those incentives are largely absent in socialist nations.
Bureaucrats and planners instead make these decisions, and neither has
reason to be beholden to consumers. Consider, for example, the immense
difference between the amount and quality of housing in communist and
capitalist countries. Government officials and planners simply do not
have the incentives for erecting comfortable and innovative developments
and structures that private builders and developers have. This is why the
communist countries have always suffered housing shortages.
This is also the reason why people in many areas in this country are
currently victims of enormous increases in rent. I refer to places like
Silicon Valley, where zoning and other government controls have prevented
housing supply from satisfying housing demand. This problem is in
large measure a product of zoning and does not exist in the absence of
land use controls.
In my book, Property and Freedom,' I compared the housing
experience during the 1970s of Harris County, Texas, which was mostly
unzoned, with that of Dallas County, Texas, an area which was largely
zoned. Houston is located in Harris County, and has never adopted zoning.
Harris County's population increased 38% in the ten-year-period from
January 1, 1970 to December 31, 1979, and its builders produced enough
1. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM:
COURTS AND LAND USE REGULATION (1997).
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housing to satisfy consumer demand without significantly increasing the
price of housing.2 This is a remarkable achievement. Dallas County's
population during this period increased only 17%, but housing prices
rose substantially 3 It does not require extraordinary genius to conclude
that the elimination or substantial reduction of zoning controls in the
Silicon Valley area would allow enough new housing to be erected that
would result in considerably lower housing prices.
But, you might say, in the absence of controls, the builders will only
build for the rich and not for the poor. Well, there are a limited number
of rich people-not enough to satisfy the alleged greed of the marketplace.
The technological revolution of recent years should convince us of the
benefits of a free market. The prices of new computers are a fraction of
what they were ten or fifteen years ago. And for those who cannot afford a
new one, the market for used computers offers incredible bargains. For
very little money, people can purchase used computers that perform tasks
that a few years ago required the use of very expensive machines.
Indeed, building for the rich is advantageous for the poor. First,
enlarging supply benefits buyers who are jointly responsible with sellers
in clearing a particular market. Once a product reaches the market, it
can only be sold to a willing consumer, regardless of the asking price.
The more products on the market, the greater the economic powers of
buyers to accept or reject an offer of sale. Second, studies show that
erecting new housing for middle and higher income buyers benefits
those who purchase lower cost used housing. This is because erecting
one new house results in one move to it from an existing home and about
two moves to other existing units, with each new move likely to improve
the housing conditions of each family or person who moves.4 Many of
these moves reach into lower income areas.
The less affluent members of our society are quite aware of the virtues
of the free market in housing. I came to this conclusion, in part, as a
result of the land use elections held in this country. Consider in this
regard, the experience of Houston, Texas-which has never adopted
zoning, and whose residents twice voted against it. The strongest
opponents of zoning in Houston are the racial minorities and low and
moderate-income whites. In Houston's 1993 zoning election, 71% of
Id at 192.
d2 at 192-97.
See JOHN B. LANSING Er AL., Nav HoMiEs AND POOR PEOPLE: A STUDY OF
CHAINS OF Movs 63-66 (1969).
2.
3.
4.

low-income African Americans voted against zoning, as did 59% of
Hispanics and 68% of low-income Caucasians. Similar results were
tabulated among these groups in the 1962 Houston zoning election. A
substantial portion of these groups also voted against the California
Coastal initiative in 1972 and the no-growth initiatives in San Diego in
1985 and 1994. 5 Other zoning elections elsewhere in the country confirm
that most low-income people reject government land use controls. 6
It is not difficult to find allies in criticizing zoning. Throughout the
country we hear demands to gut existing land use regulations because
they are either inadequate, or excessive, or both, and replace them with
"smart growth" controls. While it is a popular term without precise
definition, smart growth refers to proposals intended to restrict suburban
growth and increase city growth. The discussion in this Article will be
confined to this form of smart growth, one that is exemplified in
Portland, Oregon (discussed more later in Part IV). 7 Its proponents state
or imply that zoning, which first arrived in this nation in 1916, is and has
been harmful for the nation. 8 Yet, instead of urging elimination of these
long existing zoning controls, they propose even stronger land use
controls. Regrettably, in their zeal to overcome the past, they advocate a
system that is more fitting for an autocracy than for a free society. In a
free society, government should not be able to determine where people
live. Government should not have power to tell people who want to live
in a single-family home in a suburb that they must instead live in a
multiple-family building in a city. This form of smart growth deprives
people of their fundamental freedom to move and settle where they
choose. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court put it this way with respect to
such restraints on freedom:
The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way of the natural
forces which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in
search of a comfortable place to live. We have concluded not. A zoning

5. SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 208-09.
6. Id. at 182-83, 208-09.
7. My discussion of smart growth does not include the system adopted in
Maryland, which state officials there also refer to as smart growth. Maryland's approach
is very different from that of Portland. Professor Staley describes Maryland's system as
"providing incentives for [greater density], encouraging countywide planning, and
purchasing vacant land[,] open space and farmland with public funds to prevent private
development and preserve open space." SAMUEL R. STALEY, Markets, Smart Growth
and Limits of Policy in SMARTER GROWTH: MARKET-BASED STRATEGIES FOR LAND-USE
PLANNING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 211 (Randall G. Holcombe & Samuel R. Staley eds.,
2001). Although there is no technical or popular meaning for smart growth, I have heard
local officials discuss smart growth as a plan intended solely to stop growth in the
suburbs.
8. New York City adopted the first zoning law in 1916. See generally SEYMOUR
I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICA 172-87 (1969).
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ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in
order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration
of public services and facilities cannot be held valid.9

In the absence of government edicts, there is enough vacant land
available in this country to accommodate both people who want to live
in the suburbs and people who prefer living in the cities. Less than 6%
of the total land area of this country is developed for urban purposes.10
As any air traveler can attest, the land in this country is overwhelmingly
vacant and unimproved. Most land in this nation is devoted to
agriculture, forests, and open space, and urban development poses little
threat to curb these uses.
II. SMART GROWTH

As is evident from the Introduction, the use and development of land
in the suburbs is under attack. This attack emanates from a variety of
sources. First, environmentalists, suburbanites, and urban planners
demand that suburban acreage be restricted to uses other than urban
development (that is, for agriculture, forests, and open space). Suburbs
are now exposed to the ills of city life, and they demand relief from
additional development. Yet, as a New York judge observed many years
ago, one who chooses to live in large centers of population:
[C]annot expect the quiet of the country. Congested centers are seldom free
from smoke, odors, and other pollution from houses, shops, and factories, and
one who moves into such a region cannot hope to find the pure air of the village
or outlying districts. A person vho prefers the advantages of community life
must expect to experience some of the resulting inconveniences.II

A second source is the government officials and administrators. They
seek more taxes and subsidies for their cities and want to limit competition
for these funds from the suburbs. They want to install public transit that
will be supported by occupants of high density housing.
Both groups are formidable in American life, but they seriously
conflict with at least two equally powerful forces. First, the guarantees
of the Constitution protect mobility and ownership, and second, a great
many people want to live in the suburbs.
These critics have coalesced under the term "smart growth," which
9.
10.
11.

Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (Pa. 1965).
See SEGAN, supra note 1, at 273 n. 10.
Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37,40 (1932).

they apply as a term of derision to regulations controlling existing land use.
There is no technical or popular definition of smart growth, but it
implies that the land use practices that the nation has long followed are
dumb. According to the "smart growthers," not only have the land and
other resources been wasted, but the nation's style of living has also
been wrongly directed. I shall devote most of this Article to the form of
smart growth adopted in Portland, Oregon, which is currently the subject
of most academic and popular commentaries.
The advocates of the form of smart growth that is discussed in this
Article seek to establish urban growth boundaries restricting suburban
development and promoting growth in the cities. They urge elimination
of conventional zoning regulations and opt instead for regulations
permitting, or even requiring, traditional neighborhood developmentswith clusters of housing erected close to shops, civic services, jobs,
transit, schools, and parks.12 To fulfill its goals, smart growth requires
exclusion of people from places where they want to live. By restricting
use and development, conventional land use controls, such as zoning,
also have an exclusionary effect. But smart growth multiplies that
impact enormously. It seeks to exclude great numbers of people from
occupying substantial portions of the nation's land, violating a freedom
most cherished in this nation: the right to migrate and settle in places of
one's own choosing. If this idea achieves its objectives, smart growth
will exclude great numbers of people from suburban and rural areas,
much of which will no longer be available for residential, commercial,
and industrial use. Surely in this land of freedom there must be constitutional
safeguards against such a horrendous outcome. Fortunately, such protections
exist. In the subsequent portions of this Article, I shall explain that smart
growth appears to violate the right to travel, privileges and immunities,
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as
the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.' 3
Under prevailing laws, pursuant to which every municipality maintains
considerable autonomy, smart growth can only succeed if all municipalities
in a region adopt and enforce it. In the absence of such controls, the
development excluded by smart growth from one or more localities in the
area will likely flourish in the adjoining or nearby unrestricted localities.
Since a municipality can only control its own growth, it cannot prevent it
in other cities. Thus, to be effective in a particular region, smart growth
must apply to all of its municipalities.
Conventional political processes also create serious difficulties for
achieving smart growth. This program will have to be executed through
12.

13.

See discussion infra Part IV.
U.S. CONsT. amends. XIV, V.

[VOL 38: 693, 2001]

Land Use Controls
SAN DIEGO LAW. REVIEW

the conventional planning and political processes that regulate land use.
This process is largely controlled by residents of a municipality, which
means that under smart growth homeowners will continue to exercise a
critical role in regulating land use. Smart growth is supposed to direct
growth away from the suburbs into the cities. But existing single-family
residents in the cities will hardly welcome high-rises, other high density
multiple-family dwellings, and more stores as neighbors. Nor will they
be amenable to traffic that accompanies such development. Local
residents may not be able to stop the filling in of vacant property, but
they clearly have the political power to reduce it. The overall result of
exclusionary regulations in the suburbs and political pressures in the

cities will be very limited growth, something which many opponents of
smart growth contend is the real purpose of the idea. Some commentators

put it this way: "[O]ur greatest fear is that smart growth advocates will
achieve only half their goal-preserving undeveloped land at the
metropolitan fringe-and will not succeed in' 4creating liveable communities
at higher densities in existing urban areas."'
In a recent article, Professor Terrence Farris summarized the problems
confronting efforts to change the American housing patterns as follows:
The smart growth movement of the 1990s has seen many development and
planning associations, state and local governments, and the Clinton
administration encourage significant infill development to control sprawl and
promote revitalization. Will the 123 million projected increase in population in

the next 50 years be attracted to infill development or to outlying growth areas?
A review of 22 major central cities shows that they captured only 5.2
percent of total new metropolitan housing permits over the decade: 2.2 percent
of single-family permits and 14.9 percent of multifamily permits. This analysis
identifies the practical barriers to urban infill development, including land
assembly and infrastructure costs, unwillingness to condemn, municipal social
goal and regulatory policies, difficulty of finding developers, complexities of
public-private partnerships, excessive risks, resistance from local residents, and
stakeholder conflicts and political constraints. 15

By almost any standard, the problem of infilling the cities is overwhelming.
As Anthony Downs explains:
[T]o raise overall density from 3,500 to 7,500 persons a square mile.Ib 47.1
14. Karen A. Danielsen et al., Retracting Suburbia: Smart Growth and the Future
of Housing, 10 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 513, 528 (1999).
15. J. Terrence Farris, The Barriersto Using Urban Inffill Development to Achieve

Smart Growth, in 12 HousING POL'Y DEBATE 1 (2001).
16. "For a sense of scale: in 1990, the city of Atlanta was 2989; Portland 3504:
Los Angeles 7426; Washington, D.C., 9884; Boston 11,860; and San Francisco 15,503."

percent of all housing land would have to be redeveloped with new housing at
fifteen units per acre, 24.2 percent at twenty-five units an acre, or 14.0 percent
at forty units an acre. Clearly, any substantial increase in the residential density
of built-up areas that is to be achieved through redevelopment would require
major clearance and rebuilding. This would be a major disruption to existing
neighborhoods. 17

According to writer Gregg Easterbrook, the major beneficiaries of
smart growth will be existing suburban homeowners, the NIMBY (notin-my-backyard) crowd, who seek to exclude newcomers:
[W]hen voters complain about sprawl, what they are really saying is that
they want to preserve sprawl-at least their own version of it. So voters really
do love sprawl after all! They just do not want other people homing in. Many
of those actively complaining about traffic and growth really should be called
sprawl preservationists because their goal is to pull up the ladders and bar new
arrivals from their communities. They seek to keep housing lots large,
boulevards uncluttered, and parking
18 slots open. Maybe the best name for them
is the "Save Our Sprawl" faction.

For smart growth to succeed, most people must be willing to live in
high density city housing and reject low density suburban housing. The
smart growth advocates are seeking to impose a life style that many
Americans do not prefer. Builders and developers will not erect housing
that is unacceptable in the market. That Portland, Oregon has succeeded
in this endeavor may have little relevance to the rest of the country. As
Easterbrook points out, growth boundaries there "have rendered the high
density housing essentially the only new housing stock available, and
lots of people are eager to buy into Portland by hook or by crook." 19 In
1999, the National Association of Home Builders surveyed 2000 randomly
selected households nationwide and asked them about their housing
preferences:
You have two options: buying a $150,000 townhouse in an urban setting close
to public transportation, work, and shopping or purchasing a larger, detached
single-family home in an outlying suburban area with longer distances 20to work,
public transportation, and shopping. Which option would you choose?

Id. at 26 (citing ANTHONY DowNs, NEw VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERIcA 148 (1999)).
17. Id.
18. Gregg Easterbrook, Comment on Karen A. Danielsen, Robert E. Lang, and
William Fulton's "Retracting Suburbia: Smart Growth and the Future of Housing," 10
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 541, 542 (1999).
19. Id. at 545. But Portland is not devoid of exclusionary pressures.
In July 1998, the Portland Planning Commission suspended plans to add 7,500
apartments, row houses, and homes in Southwest Portland after residents
protested and requested less aggressive housing densities. Voters in suburban
Portland attempted to close their doors to compact housing and even recalled a
mayor and two council members over dense development and a neighborhood
light-rail alignment.
Farris, supra note 15, at 23 (citation omitted).
20. See Danielsen et al., supra note 14, at 521-22 (citation omitted).
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Eighty-three percent of the respondents selected the suburban houses
while seventeen percent preferred the city houses. This survey is, of
course, not conclusive on the issues, but it at least suggests that the long
established pattern of relocation continues to exist in this nation. A 1997
Fannie May survey confirms the results of the builders' study: "70% of
Americans prefer to live in suburbs, small towns far from cities, or rural
areas. 2 1

m. LEGALrrY OF SMART GROWTH
Smart growth raises many constitutional issues. First and foremost, it
may violate the right of movement, which American law refers to as the
right to travel. The United States Supreme Court has long held that the
Constitution guarantees this right of movement and has struck down
laws that deter, impede, or penalize settlement into various parts of the
nation.2 2 Time and again the Supreme Court has held that the right to
remove from one place and move to another according to inclination is
an attribute of personal liberty.2- In 1849, in the PassengerCases, 4 the
Court declared the following, which it has often reiterated in subsequent
years:
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are
one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States;
and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and
trespass
through any part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own
25
States.

This right to migrate and settle is accorded constitutional protection as a
fundamental right and legal restraints upon it must pass strict scrutiny,
the highest level of judicial review.
Statistics reveal that the right to travel is a highly utilized liberty. In
the 1950s, 57% of the people living in what government statisticians call
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA's) were located in central cities; in
1960, the percentage was 49; in 1970, it was 43; in 1980, it was 40; and

21. Farris, supra note 15, at 7.
22. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 510-11 (1999); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 360 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638, 642 (1969): Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
23. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 629; Shapiro,394 U.S. at 619.
24. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
25. Id.at 492 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).

in 1990, it was about 37.26
People change their residence for a wide variety of reasons. Some of
these are jobs, weather, environment, education, family, health, congestion,
culture, and government benefits. Many move just for the sake of
moving. These are all personal preferences which free societies have
long protected. Writing in the mid-1700s, William Blackstone, the great
English commentator, asserted that the common law recognized this
right. He stated that England secures "the power of locomotion, of
changing situations or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's
own inclinations may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless
by due course of law., 27 The Articles of Confederation, which governed
relations between the states prior to the ratification of the U.S.
Constitution, secured free inhabitants "all the privileges and immunities
of free citizens in the several States" and guaranteed the people of each
state "free ingress and regress to and from any other state."28 The U.S.
Supreme Court interprets the Constitution as guaranteeing the right to
migrate and settle as a fundamental personal liberty. 29 The right to travel
also has a strong relationship to the freedom of expression, according a
dissenting member of a community "the option of exiting and relocating
30
in a community whose values he or she finds more compatible."
The modern U.S. Supreme Court cases protecting the right to travel
began with Edwards v. California.3 1 In 1937, California passed a statute
imposing a criminal penalty on anyone bringing nonresident indigents
into the state.32 California insisted that its intention was not to exclude
newcomers. Instead, the state claimed its purpose was to protect its
residents from the many problems associated with indigency, such as
disease, crime, and immorality. In Edwards,33 the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously struck down the statute, with five justices asserting that the
law violated the domestic commerce clause of Article 134 and four basing
their opinion on the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 35 No state, said the Court, may "isolate itself from difficulties
26. Peter Mieszkowski & Edwin S. Miller, The Causes of Metropolitan
Suburbanization,7 J. ECON. PERSP. 135-39 (1993), reprintedin ROBERT C. ELLICKSON
& VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 2 (2000).

27. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 34
(William Draper Lewis ed., 1897) (1765).
28. U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV.
29. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 341 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 619 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
30. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 178-79 (1980).
31. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
32. Id. at 171.
33. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 167-68 (brief for appellee).
34. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 177.
35. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 181 (Douglas, J., concurring), 182 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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common to all of them by restraining the transportation of persons and
property across its borders., 36 The Court pointed out that those excluded
"are deprived of the opportunity to exert political pressure upon the
37
California legislature in order to obtain a change in policy.
In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court in Shapiro v Thompson,-8 confronted a
comparable problem. This case involved laws of Pennsylvania, Connecticut,
and the District of Columbia intended to exclude welfare recipients from
migrating into their jurisdictions by denying welfare assistance to residents
of the state or district who had not resided there for at least one year
immediately preceding their applications for such assistance. The oneyear waiting period was designed to discourage the influx of poor
families in need of assistance. The two states and the district contended
that the one-year requirement was justified (1) as an attempt to
discourage those indigents who would enter the state solely to obtain
larger benefits than they were receiving in the states from which they
traveled, (2) as a protective device to preserve the fiscal integrity of
public assistance programs, and (3) to implement certain administrative
and related governmental objectives. 39 The Court held that these
purposes failed to justify infringing on the right to travel. 40 "[Iln moving
[to another jurisdiction, the plaintiffs] were exercising a [fundamental]
right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest, is unconstitutional.' 4' To be upheld as valid, a regulation limiting
the exercise of a fundamental right must be shown to be (1) necessary to
achieve 4a2 compelling state interest and (2) narrowly drawn to achieve
that end.
Dunn v. Blumstein4 3 concerned a Tennessee law requiring a citizen to
be a resident of a state for one year and of the county for three months
before he could vote. This restriction affected two fundamental rights,
the right to travel and the right to vote, and the U.S. Supreme Court held
that neither restraint was shown to be justified by a compelling state

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id- at 173.
Id.at 174.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
ld.
at 627, 629, 633-34.
Id.at 638.
M at 634.
IL; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972),
405 U.S. 330 (1972).

interest.44 The Court explained that the violation of the right to migrate
and settle was a sufficient basis for its ruling. It stated that the right to
travel had been violated because discrimination had occurred against
persons who had recently exercised that right. The plaintiff was a
resident of the state and argued that the lengthy county durational
requirement did not serve any compelling interest. The Court agreed,
stating in its opinion "that the freedom to travel includes the 'freedom to
enter and abide in any State in the Union.' ' 45 The state's interest in
preventing voter fraud could be served by a much shorter waiting
period.46
In Saenz v. Roe,47 the most recent case involving the right to travel, the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down a 1992 California statute limiting the
maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived citizens. The law
restricted the amount payable to a family that had resided in the state for
less than twelve months to the amount payable by the state of the
family's prior residence.4 8 The objective was again exclusionary, that is,
to deter welfare recipients from settling in California, whose welfare
benefits are among the highest in the nation. The Court held that
California's law violated both the fundamental right to travel and the
49
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to the Court, "since the right to travel embraces the citizen's
right to be treated equally in her new State of residence, the
discriminatory classification is itself a penalty. 5 ° Moreover, the
privileges and immunities clause entitled these newly arrived citizens to
the same welfare benefits enjoyed by other citizens. 5' The Court
explained this conclusion by quoting from a dissenting opinion in the
1873 Slaughter-House Cases:
The States have not now, if they ever had, any power to restrict their citizenship
to any classes or persons. A citizen of the United States has a perfect
constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he chooses, and to claim
citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with every other citizen;
and the
52
whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain him in that right.

44. Id. at 335, 360.
45. Id. at 338 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285 (1970) (Stewart, J.,
concurring and dissenting)).
46. Id. at 348-49.
47. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
48. Id. at 499-500.
49. Id. at 500-04, 510--Il.
50. Id. at 505.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 503-04 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
112-13 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting)).
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Under California's statute, former residents of Louisiana and Oklahoma
would receive $190 and $341 per month, respectively, while the full
California grant available to longer residents was $641.
The former
resident of Colorado was limited to $280 per month and the full grant
would be $504 if she had not been a recent arrival in California."' The
differences are not as great as they appear since housing costs were
much higher in California, whose rents were then higher than in any
other state except Massachusetts. Moreover, in his dissenting opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that new California residents were
also eligible for homeless assistance, an increase in the food stamp
allowance, health care benefits under Medicaid, the full five-year period
of welfare payments, and to a full range of employment, training, and
the accompanying supporting services.5-Under smart growth, many citizens who seek to move to a state that
has imposed these restrictions will not be able to build or rent housing in
their chosen area, two opportunities that were available to those who
settled there earlier. "[O]ur cases," said the Saenz Court, "have not
identified any acceptable reason for qualifying the protection afforded
by the [privileges and immunities] Clause for 'the "citizen of State A
who ventures into State B" to settle there and establish a home."' 56
The privileges and immunities clause may accordingly be applied to
protect migrants to a state from certain exclusionary regulations, such as
being able to reside in the area of one's choice. Once a nonresident
citizen becomes a resident of a state, he or she is entitled to the benefits
of residency. According to Saenz, regulations limiting privileges and
immunities are also subject to strict scrutiny.-' Similar to justifications
made for smart growth laws, California asserted its welfare law was
based on financial savings for the state, which it said amounted to $10

million annually.
The very high level of scrutiny accorded the right to travel is evident
in the case of Attorney Generalof New York v.Soto-Lopez,5s decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986. The case involved a New York statute
that granted special bonus points for one civil service examination to

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 494.
Id.
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id at 502.
Id. at 504.
Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 909 (1986).

New York veterans (1) who served in time of war, and (2) were residents
of the state when they entered the military service.59 This law thus
awarded these veterans a preference in obtaining civil service
employment. Two veterans who met all eligibility requirements except
having a New York residence when they entered the army filed suit to
have the law declared unconstitutional. The lead opinion in the case
held the law to be invalid because it penalized those veterans who had
exercised their right to migrate to another state at the time they joined
the military. 60 "Such a permanent deprivation of a significant benefit,
based only on the fact of nonresidence at a past point in time, clear,
operates to penalize appellees for exercising their rights to migrate."
Replying to the argument that the benefits involved were not substantial,
the opinion countered that the award of bonus points in just one exam
can mean the difference between winning or losing civil service
employment.62 While it is always difficult to compare different kinds of
benefits, one may reasonably conclude that smart growth's exclusionary
laws are more harsh than the deprivations sustained by reason of the
Soto Lopez and Saenz regulations.
Proponents of smart growth should consider the constitutional frailty
of the concept before they impose it on the people. The foregoing cases
indicate that a resident of a state is exercising the right to travel when he
leaves that state to settle in a suburb of a smart growth state. The
receiving state must protect and not deter or penalize this travel because
it is a fundamental right of the U.S. Constitution. Once this person
elects to become a permanent resident, the privileges and immunities
clause requires that he be treated like other citizens of the state. As a
resident of a state, he or she is entitled to the benefits and burdens of
residency-the use of the facilities as well as the responsibility of paying
for their use.63 In Saenz, the Court interpreted the clause as prohibiting
the state from denying the plaintiff welfare benefits that are available to
existing residents of the state. A smart growth state cannot exclude him
because this would violate his right to travel and cannot deny him
benefits after he has settled that other residents receive because this
would violate his privileges and immunities rights.
While the cases previously discussed involve solely interstate travel,
the right of travel is protected for all who seek to exercise it, whether for
interstate or intrastate purposes. Severe development limitations in
suburban communities will prevent or deter movement both by those
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 900.
Id. at 909.
Id.
Id. at 908.
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 (1999).
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who live in another state as well as by those who live within the same
state. Existing residents of a state are no less entitled to exercise these
rights than out-of-state residents. 6 Indeed, it could be unfair to deny
existing residents this fundamental right while protecting it for out-ofstate residents.
Travel is not the only constitutional right which smart growth may
violate. In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has increased its protection
of property rights by way of the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment,65 which the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states.
The Court now applies an intermediate level of scrutiny to determine the
constitutionality of zoning and other land use regulations, as follows:
"The application of a [land use ordinance] to particular property effects a
taking [under the Fifth Amendment] if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests.., or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land. 6 6
To achieve its goals, smart growth must place limits on the use of land
both within and outside of a boundary growth line. It must curb or
greatly reduce development exterior to the line and lower density
requirements within it. Suburban land owners will complain that the
government has deprived them of the use of their property while existing
city residents will contend that lowering density and other zoning
requirements for adjoining land seriously reduces the value of their
property. Under the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, a smart
growth locality will have considerable difficulty proving that such
regulations substantially advance a legitimate state interest and do not
deny an owner economically viable use of his land. The following
Supreme Court decisions explain these rules and the legal problems they
impose on a government seeking to restrict the ordinary and benign use
of land.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Connission,67 the Supreme Court
held that the California Coastal Commission violated the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment because the regulation at issue did not advance
its alleged purpose. 68 The Commission required the Nollans to grant an

64. See discussion infra Part V (discussing the matter of intrastate movement).
65. U.S. CONST. amend V. The Fifth Amendment provides that: "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." Id.
66. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980) (citation omitted).
67. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
68. 1l at 837.

easement to the state across the ocean frontage of their beachfront property
as a condition for obtaining a permit to rebuild their house. 69 The Court
stated that the purpose of the regulation must be a "legitimate state
interest" and the regulation must "substantially advance" that interest70
The Commission's purpose in obtaining the easement was to enhance
the public's "visual access" to the beach which it contended the Nollan's
new house blocked. 7 The Court assumed this purpose was "legitimate.' 72
However, it found the easement did not achieve this purpose; there was
no "essential nexus" between the easement and the public's visual access
to the beach. 3
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on
the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any
obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also impossible
to understand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using the public
beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused by
construction of the Nollans' new house. We therefore find that the Commission's
imposition of the permit condition cannot
be treated as an exercise of its land74
use power for any of these purposes.

Dolan v. City of Tigard,75 which also involved a determination
whether a regulation achieved its purpose, concerned a requirement by
the City of Tigard, Oregon that Mrs. Dolan dedicate to the city ten
percent of her property for improvement of a storm drain and
pedestrian/bike path as conditions for a permit to expand and rebuild her
property.76 The appropriate test to determine whether a taking took
place is similar to the test applied in Nollan. This case goes one step
further than Nollan by establishing the requisite degree of connection
needed to satisfy the constitutional requirement. As the Court explained,
"[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must
make some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both
77 in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development.,
Applying this test, the Court found that the city failed to establish that
the required dedication of property was necessary to establish a storm
drain and bicycle path. The decision implies that nothing more than an
easement for these purposes was required and not a transfer of

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 828.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 838-39.

75.

512 U.S. 374 (1994).

76.
77.

Id. at 380.
Id. at 391.
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ownership to the city. 8
Another constitutional issue that confronts smart growth is whether a
locality's regulations deprive the owner of all economically viable use of
his land. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,79 the issue was
whether South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act violated the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment by prohibiting Lucas from
building two houses on lots that he purchased for about one million
dollars.8 0 Under the Act, Lucas was barred from building any habitable
structure on these lots. 81 There was no such prohibition affecting the
property when he purchased it.82 However, the law permitted occupancy
ina moveable trailer or tent located on the property and picnicking or
swimming on it, and since each lot was large enough to constitute a
building site, it might be sold for a substantial sum to an adjoining
homeowner (for personal use and as a protection against adverse use in
Thus, the owner was not denied all
the future) or an investor-speculator.
83
use or all value of his property.
While Lucas was not deprived of all use or value, he was denied his
investment-backed expectation to build two houses. Since it was
determined that Lucas' building of the two houses did not constitute a
nuisance but was merely a legitimate exercise of his property rights, a
taking had occurred and Lucas was entitled to just compensation.,
All of the foregoing property issues were litigated in a 1999 case
which held that a jury could decide these questions and award damages.
In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.," after the
city rejected Del Monte Dunes' application to develop its land, Del
Monte Dunes brought suit for damages for a constitutional violation
under the federal civil rights law. 6 The District Court submitted the
case to the jury on Del Monte Dunes' theory that the city effected a
regulatory taking or otherwise injured the property by unlawful acts,
without paying compensation. The Court instructed the jury to find for
Del Monte Dunes if it found either that it had been denied all
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id at 395-96.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Id. at 1008-09.
Id
Id at 1008.
Id. at 1015.
Id at 1031-32.
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
Id. at 694.

economically viable use of its property (per Lucas) or that the city's
decision to reject the final development proposal did not substantially
advance a legitimate public purpose (per Nollan and Dolan).87 The jury
found for Del Monte Dunes and awarded it $1.45 million in damages.8
The involvement of a jury tends to expose a municipality to a higher
amount of damages than a judge might impose.
The rule that government must not deprive owners of all economically
viable use of their property comprehends two guarantees for property
rights: first, protection of investment-backed expectations, such as
occurred in the Lucas case, and second, protection against the
deprivation of all commercial value. Smart growth that requires land
exterior to the urban growth line to be restricted solely for agricultural
use may deprive the owner of economically viable use, mandating either

payment of just compensation or elimination of the restriction.
Smart growth seeks to substantially advance, among others, these
legitimate state interests: maintaining an adequate agriculture production,
maintaining forests and open space, reducing traffic congestion, and
reducing air pollution. Statistics cast doubt that smart growth will
substantially advance these goals. The Economics and Statistics
Administration of the U.S. Census Bureau indicates that as of 1992 less
than 6% of the total surface area of the nation was developed. 89 The
87. Id. at 700.
88. Id. at 701.
89. See SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 273 n.10; U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE ET AL.,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1996, at 29 (1996). This figure excludcs
Alaska and the District of Columbia and includes urban and built-up areas in units of ten
acres or greater, as well as rural transportation (roads, highways, railroads). Based on
these statistics, the following figures explain my estimate that about 6% of the land is
developed for urban purposes:
Total surface area
1,940,011 (thousands of acres)
Amount of developed nonfederal land
92,352
Total amount of federal land
407,969
Five percent of federal land
(My estimate of amount developed)
20,398
Approximate total developed land
112,750
Percent of developed land
5.8%
SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 273 n.10. Alaska contains 385,482,000 acres of total surface
area and the District of Columbia contains 39,000 acres. Including the amount of
development in these two areas would lower the percentage of total developed land. Id.;
see also U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, American Agriculture: Its Capacity to Produce,
FARM INDEX, Dec. 1973, at 8-9. This study shows that in 1969, cities, highways, and
airports occupied about 2.5% of the nation's land area. A more recent estimate states
that urban areas use about 60 million acres, or 3.1% of the over 1.9 billion acres of land
in the continental U.S. (not including Alaska and Hawaii). STEVEN HAYWARD ET AL.,
LEADING ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS 34 (1993). Thomas Frey indicates that in 1974,
urbanized areas and urban places, rural roads, railroads, airports, and military and
nuclear installations occupied 4.4% of the area of the forty-eight contiguous states. H.
THOMAS FREY, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, MAJOR USES OF LAND IN THE UNITED
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total acreage of the continental United States is close to two billion
acres.90 Urban and suburban use of land has been growing at about one
million acres per year since the end of World War 11.91 On the basis of
these figures, urban development presents a small threat to these other
uses for a long time in the future.
Consider, in this respect, existing agricultural production. Raw land is

but one factor in total agricultural production and, as the Green
Revolution has proven, is less important than the application of plant
genetics and fertilizers to increase farm output. In the United States,
factors other than land together "contribute about three times as much as
land to total agricultural production. This being the case, the 'adequacy'
of land cannot be determined independently of the cost and productivity
of the land relative to the costs and productivities of other factors." 92
"According to indices of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),

the American agricultural sector was 158 percent more productive at the

end of the 1980s than at the beginning of the 1960s." 93 World commodity
prices have fallen from
94 1980 to 1992, confirming the adequacy of world
agricultural markets.
By most measures, the condition of forests in the United States is
improving, not deteriorating.
Although large areas of the eastern United States were deforested in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the trend dramatically reversed beginning
in the early 1950s. As of 1992, annual timber growth in the United States has
exceeded harvest every year since 1952, according to the U.S. Forest Service.
By the mid-1990s, the number of wooded acres in the nation was three times
what it was in 1920. The results in two northeastern states, New Hampshire and
Vermont, are dramatic. New Hampshire is now about 86 percent forested,
compared to 50 percent in 1850. In Vermont, the area covered by forest is
about 67 percent, up from 35 percent one hundred years ago....

1974 (1979).
90. SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 273 n.l0.
91. See HAYWARD ET AL., supra note 89, at 34 (explaining the amount of land use
for urban and suburban purposes discussed in Steven Hayward, The Suburbinization of
America 9-11 in A GUIDETO SMART GRO\TII (Jane S. Shaw et al. eds., 2000).
92. JOHN A. CHARLES, CASCADE POLICY INsTTrT, SulwslARY No. 1068 BEYOND
ZONING: LAND USE CONTROLS INTHE DIGITAL ECONOMY 1 (June 1998) (quoting Pierre
R. Crosson, The Long-Term Adequacy ofAgriculturalLand in the United States. in THE
CROPLAND CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY 3 (1982)).
93. Id (quoting DE WIEL Er AL, PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTrTUTE FOR PUBUC POUCY
STATES:

AND THE FRASER INSTITUTE INDEX OF LEADING ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS FOR THE
U.S. AND CANADA43 (1997).

94.

Id at 2.

Economist Stephen Moore notes that no current or future shortage of trees
is evidenced by the price data on forestry products. Writing in 1992, he stated
that over the past decade the real prices of paper and lumber fell by 10 percent
and 30 percent respectively. Indexed to wages, 1992 lumber prices were onethird of those in 1950, one-sixth of those in 1900, and roughly one-tenth of prices
in 1800. Human resourcefulness-improved forestry technologies and
other innovations-has in large measure been responsible for the increase in
accounts for the improved affordability of paper and
wood inventory that
95
lumber over time.

To determine whether smart growth controls will substantially reduce
air pollution and street congestion requires analysis of specific proposals.
As the decisions in the previously cited cases reveal, under present
takings law the burden is on the government to prove that the regulations
substantially reduce these ills. The locality would have to prove that
much more benefit has been achieved than merely shifting traffic
congestion and air pollution from the suburb to the city. There are many
other considerations that would be relevant in the analysis and are
beyond the scope of this Article. It is clear, however, that the Court will
not approve of limitations on property rights in the absence of strong
justifications for such action.
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is another
guarantee available to landowners aggrieved by smart growth regulations.
In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,9 6 as a condition to having access to
the Village's water supply, Willowbrook demanded that Olech (a
property owner) grant the Village a 33-foot easement. 97 He objected,
claiming that the Village only required a 15-foot easement from other
property owners seeking access to the water supply. After a three-month
delay, the Village relented and agreed to provide Olech water access
with only a 15-foot easement.9 8 He subsequently sued the Village for
violating his rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, asserting99that the 33-foot easement demand was "irrational
and wholly arbitrary."
Rejecting Willowbrook's argument that an equal protection claim
could not be brought by a "class of one," the U.S. Supreme Court
95. SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 219 (citations omitted); Stephen Moore, So Much for
"Scarce Resources," 1992 PUB. INT. 97, 103. "Moore points out that the most objective
method of resolving the question of whether resources are becoming more or less scarce
is by examining their price trends. 'Price is the most objective way that economists have
of measuring relative scarcity of a good or service."' SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 274 n.27
(quoting Moore, supra, at 100). "He concludes that, following a decade of declining
prices, '[tioday most natural resources are cheaper in the U.S. than at any time in the last
200 years."' SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 274 n.27 (quoting Moore, supra, at 107).
96. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
97. Id. at 565.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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unanimously held that one person could establish an equal protection
claim on behalf of only one party.100 "[Tihe purpose of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person
within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by
its improper execution through duly constituted agents.''
Justice Steven Breyer concurred in this ruling, but stated that in his
opinion the argument did not to apply in run-of-the-mill zoning cases
because the plaintiff had alleged that the Village's demand for the 33foot easement was motivated by ill will.'1 2 The Court of Appeals, which
had ruled in favor of Olech prior to the Supreme Court's opinion, also
relied in part on this aspect of his complaint."0 3 However, the other
justices of the Supreme Court did not accept the appeals court theory of
"subjective ill will."'
The allegations that the Village acted
"irrational[ly] and wholly arbitrar[ily]," stated the Supreme Court's
opinion, are sufficient, quite apart from the Village's subjective
motivations, to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection
analysis. 05
Inasmuch as zoning is very much a matter of line drawing between
various land uses, the case opens up this process to heightened judicial
scrutiny. As Breyer observes, a rule "that looks only to an intentional
difference in treatment and a lack of a rational basis for that different
treatment ' 10 6 without relying on "subjective ill will," might transform
many ordinary violations of city or state zoning laws into violations of
the Constitution. However, since no other justice agreed with Breyer's
concurrence, the opinion confirms a property owner's protection against
discriminatory state conduct under the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
The most important line under smart growth is the urban growth
boundary that separates the area where growth is encouraged from the
area where growth is discouraged. In the Portland area, the location of
its Urban Growth Boundary (UGB) is entirely subjective and made by a
100.
101.

(1923)).
102.

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id at 564.
d (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445

I at 565-66 (Breyer J. concurring).
Md at 563-64.
Idat 565.
Id
I (Breyer J., concurring).

seven-person elected board. 10 7 A study of Portland's UGB reveals that,
in 1996, land zoned for single-family housing just inside the UGB was
priced at $120,000 per acre while land outside the boundary was selling
for approximately $18,000 per acre.108 Moving the line to include more
developable land would lower prices within the boundary and raise them
on land previously exterior to it. Owners of land outside the boundary
are surely entitled to demand constitutional justification for a location
that greatly burdens them. The Olech case provides property owners a
remedy against "irrational and wholly arbitrary" movement of or
continued existence of the UGB at its present location."19
A primary objective of smart growth is to eliminate or reduce urban
sprawl. This goal can be achieved without destroying the right to travel
or the right of property. Rescinding regulations prohibiting or restricting
development in the cities will prevent a considerable amount of
development from being forced into the suburbs. There is ajudicial rule
that when a legislature seeks to limit a constitutionally protected liberty,
it must consider whether a measure less restrictive of liberty exists that
could instead be applied to achieve the same result." 10 In other words, is
the restriction of the liberty-in the case of smart growth, the rights of
travel and property-the only means available to achieve the desired
end?"' If removing regulations on land development in the cities will
accomplish the same result as limiting the rights to travel and to use
property, restrictions on these liberties should not be imposed.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island"2 raised the question of the rights of a land
purchaser to use property for a purpose that the municipality had
forbidden prior to his purchase. The U.S. Supreme Court struck down
Rhode Island's position that the preacquisition enactment of a land
restriction defeats any takings claim based on that restriction." 3 In this
case, the state argued that the purchaser was fully aware of the
restriction on the property and had no reason to claim harm." 4 The U.S.
Supreme Court held that the land owner's claim is not barred by the
mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the

107. See Danielsen et al., supra note 14, at 527-28 (discussing UGB Strategies);
Metro, Metro Charter, at http://www.metro-region.org/glance/chartcr.html
(last
modified June 8, 2001).
108. John A. Charles, Lessons from the PortlandExperience, in A GUIDE TO SMART
Growth 123 (Jane S. Shaw et al. eds., 2000).
109. Olech, 528 U.S. at 565.
110. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 492, 507 (1996).
111. See id.
112. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S.Ct. 2448 (2001).
113. Id. at2457.
114. Id.
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restriction. 5 Palazzolo's takings claim to develop certain wetlands is
ripe when the local government continuously rejects applications for
such use even if the property is acquired after the regulations forbidding
this use were adopted.
Accordingly, there are sufficient constitutional reasons for invalidating
major provisions of smart growth legislation. Whether this will occur is
always an open question in highly controversial cases-until it actually
happens. It is usually very difficult to predict in any pending case how
the nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court will rule. Prior to a judicial
decision, the best advice that can be offered lawmakers is to consider
such an eventuality in their deliberations and actions.
IV. URBAN SPRAVL
There is no technical definition of urban sprawl. It usually describes
the spread of housing and commercial and industrial buildings into
developing or undeveloped areas. Urban planners apply the term
broadly to include recent urban development in suburban and rural areas,
which makes many parts of the country eligible for this description.
Many small cities or towns began their existence as urban sprawl.
Examples exist in almost every area of the country.
Urban sprawl also refers to a leap-froggng pattern of growth where
new construction is not erected consecutively to existing development.
It is an inevitable consequence of urbanization, and will occur under any
system of private or even public ownership, since vacant land next to a
development may not be appropriate or desirable for use at a particular
time.
The adjoining land may no longer be in demand for housing or other
purposes. It may be too expensive or too big or small; sewer and water
facilities may be inadequate. It may not be for sale, may be subject to
title and legal questions, and may possibly even have unusual
topographical or soil conditions. And of course, the zoning may be
entirely wrong for a proposed use.
Sprawling development is usually not advantageous to builders. They
generally seek to build consecutively because most of their customers,
both home buyers and renters, prefer being near existing development.
This is borne out by the fact that, in developing sections, land abutting
development frequently sells for more than land in more remote sections
115.

Id. at2465.

because the demand for it is greater. At the same time, builders seek to
conserve land. To accommodate their purchasers, most of whom do not
have or want to spend the extra money required to purchase larger lots,
builders will tend in most instances to conserve on the size of vacant
lots. As a consequence, their normal practices will operate to conserve
land. The most affluent people in the population are exceptions to this
generalization; they want large lots, but they are a small part of the
housing market.
All of this is in sharp contrast to the impact of current zoning
practices, which have been fostered by the "no growth" or "controlled
growth" groups, who have for a long period ignored the adverse
consequences these laws have on the conservation of the nation's
resources. First of all, until the advent of smart growth planning, most
environmental groups urged the passage of low density limitations
requiring fewer homes per acre and curtailing development of garden
apartments and high-rises.
They would demand, for example, a
regulation allowing only two houses per acre instead of four or five,
which necessarily causes greater housing spread.
Second, by restricting the erection of garden apartments and high-rises,
they have forced people who prefer to live in these accommodations to live
in homes which occupy substantially more land per residence. A threestory apartment complex containing 250 to 300 units may occupy less
than 10 acres. It might require 80 to 100 acres to house the same number of
families in homes. In effect, each floor of an apartment building adds to
the supply of land.
Third, there is considerable effort to limit the creation of new
shopping facilities whose existence lessen the use of the automobile.
Fourth, when certain communities restrict the erection of housing,
developers are forced to build in places where they will encounter less
resistance, usually the more rural and outlying sections. Thus,
imposition of zoning regulations in a city not related to health or safety
will lead to considerably more use of land in a county, and the new
construction is more distant than ever from shopping and employment.
Smart growthers contend that urban sprawl has eroded the American
dream of home ownership. "The suburbs attracted people looking for
privacy, home ownership, mobility, lower taxes, and freedom from
crime; today suburban residents experience unhealthy air, environmental
degradation, intractable traffic congestion, a declining sense of community,
and a loss of open space."' 6 One might ask, "How can anyone but a
116. Janice C. Griffith, The Preservation of Community Green Space: Is Georgia
Ready to Combat Sprawl with Smart Growth?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 563, 568
(2000).
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fool want to live in such horrible conditions? And raise their children in
such an environment?" Obviously, enormous numbers of people are
willing and anxious to do so. For many millions of people, it is apparent
that the drawbacks of suburban life are by far overcome by its benefits.
Because we are all different, one's pleasures may be another's woes.
When it comes to decisions about shelter, the U.S. Constitution protects
individual choice on the theory that people will best perceive their own
interests in this respect, and government should not deter or penalize that
choice.
Smart growth regulations affecting both sides of urban growth
boundaries impose burdens on the production, supply, and distribution
of housing, substantially interfering with the nation's goal of providing
more and better housing for the people. As history reveals, there is no
better stimulus to supply than the freedom of the marketplace. In the
absence of government restrictions, entrepreneurs will seek to obtain
profits, recognition, and glory by producing goods and services to satisfy
demand. As a result, and notwithstanding numerous regulatory burdens,
this nation enjoys an enormous supply of food, clothing, and shelter.
Removing large amounts of land from production will harm the nation's
housing supply.
Such programs will also injure the economy, which depends on the
building industry for jobs and profits. In the absence of extraordinary
circumstances that threaten well-being, such an outcome should be
avoided. Moreover, according to the Census Bureau this nation will
likely increase from 280 million in 2000 to 403 million in 2050, requiring
about 60 million new housing units over the existing 115 million
housing units." 7 The nation will have to devote more land than ever for
uban areas, and smart growth will impede that objective.' 18
The term "smart growth" is associated with the kind of regulations
imposed in recent years in the metropolitan area of Portland, Oregon
under its Urban Growth Boundary (UGB) program. The residents of the
Portland area have elected a regional government called Metro with
authority to regulate land use and development in twenty-four adjoining
cities and three counties." 9 These regulations deny erection of most
new structures beyond the UGB, a line drawn around this area, which is
117. Farris, supra note 15, at 1.
118. Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 543.
119. Metro, Welcome to Metro, at http://wwv.metro-region.orgfindex.htnl (Ilast
modified Aug. 23, 2001).

about twenty minutes from downtown Portland.
Accordingly, a
nonresident who wants to live in Portland is limited to purchasing either
an existing home there within or outside of the UGB or a newly built
dwelling within the UGB. Despite the enthusiasm of the "smart growthers,"
Portland has not solved an inherent flaw of zoning. Smart growth controls
are likewise governed by the political planning process, which is highly
responsive to the prevailing political pressures. The rights of people
who might want to live in Portland are dependent on Portland's political
processes, in which they have no representation.
Planners boast that the Portland metropolitan area achieved its growth
objectives by the political magic of consensus. 120 But this consensus
does not include persons who are greatly affected by such a decisionthose who are being excluded from residing in the city. The powers of a
municipality are confined to regulating local interests. They do not have
the power to regulate the interests of nonresidents, inasmuch as they did
not elect its lawmakers. Since local politicians have little incentive to
consider the interests of outsiders, the latter have no opportunity to exert
political pressure on a municipality to enact or change land use
regulations. Under these circumstances, a basic principle of democratic
government-that it governs only those who elect it-is violated. The
right to travel of would-be residents of Portland has accordingly been
restricted.
Contrary to the usual practices of zoning authorities, Metro seeks to
reduce the maximum lot size for a single-family home. Some even
advocate reducing total size even further to enable high-rises to be built.
Metro bans America's leading retailers, such as Walmart, Price Club,
and Home Depot. 12 1 Again, unlike prevailing zoning practices, Metro
wants owners of commercial properties to reduce parking space and
eventually charge for parking. All of these efforts are intended to reduce
reliance on the automobile. As of early 2001, only about 2% of city
residents ride the light rail, but the figure is expected to increase to 6%.
Due in large measure to its building restrictions, housing costs over the
years have increased substantially, and Portland is now one of the most
expensive cities in the West.
While many Portland residents seem to enjoy a comfortable existence,
the same cannot be said for residents of inner-city areas. Between 1990
and 1995, for example, housing prices in inner-city areas-southeast
Portland, northeast Portland, and northern Portland-increased by 85%,
120. But see RANDAL O'TOOLE, THE VANISHING AUTOMOBILE AND OTHER URBAN
MYTHS 190-95 (2001). O'Toole argues that many voters were indifferent or actually
hostile to the city's program. Id.
121. See Steven Hayward, Legends of the Sprawl: Liberals Have a New Scapegoat
for Their Urban Failures:Suburban Growth, POL'Y REv., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 31.
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78%, and 103% respectively, while the suburban communities averaged
a 45% increase. 122 In large measure, the increase in poorer areas is
attributed to gentrification. Inner-city gentrification burdens are born
mainly by Portland's poor. When they are displaced by higher income
families, poor families have difficulty locating affordable housing on the
urban fringe and in suburban areas. Local authorities have sought to
impose inclusionary requirements on developers that would require a
percentage of conventional housing projects to include low income
affordable units. As of this writing, however, these plans have not been
adopted.
Portland's decision to place the UGB at a certain location is not
costless to housing consumers. Clearly, if there were no UGB, much
more land would be available for housing and this change would be
reflected in a lower housing price. Or, if the UGB were placed further
from downtown, say twenty-five minutes instead of twenty minutes
away, there would still be a considerable increase in the supply of
housing. The high price of land within the UGB and the resulting
limitation on production of housing restrict housing supply.
Accordingly, not only does smart growth curtail the exercise of
constitutional rights, as described in Part III, but it also considerably
restricts operation of the housing market. In the many environmental
controversies continually arising in this nation, societal benefits of
decent and affordable housing are often overlooked. Yet housing
certainly warrants high environmental priority. After all, one's home is
the place where the major part of life is spent. Its characteristics greatly
influence the quality of one's life. In recent years, three presidential
commissions have asserted that lowering the cost and increasing the
Each
availability of housing are major objectives of the nation. imposing
for
of
localities
critical
highly
been
also
commission has
unnecessary restraints on the production and supply of housing.
In its report published in 1982, President Reagan's housing commission
even urged that governments at various levels consider rescinding local
122. SAzMUEL R. STALEY Er AL, REASON PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, A LINE IN THE
LAND: URBAN-GROWrfH BOUNDARIES, SMART GROWTH, AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY:
LESSONS FROM PORTLAND 22 (1999).

123. Bernard H. Siegan, Consening and Developing the Land, 27 SAN DIEGO L
REv. 279, 282-86 (1990) (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON URBAN HOUSING. A DECEN-r
HomE 143 (1969); NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS TO THE CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT, BUILDING THE AMEICAN CITY 20 (1968); REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON

HOUSING, § IV (1982)).

land use regulations that limit production of housing. 124 Land use
121
regulation, this commission concluded, was the problem, not the solution.
Deregulation would not only remove
the wrongs and abuses, but would
126
better serve the public interest.
There is a tendency to minimize the benefits of housing production
with the assumption that it largely helps the more affluent people. This
is a wrong assumption because building of homes is rewarding both for
the future occupants and also for the many more who, as a result, will be
able to move to other housing. If they move, they are doing so to benefit
themselves. Voluntary movement of persons from one house to another
is known as the "filtering process" in housing.
Filtering in housing occurs when new homes and apartments are
constructed and families move into them, vacating their former
residences for occupancy by others. The others, in turn, may vacate still
other units, and the process continues through a number of sequences. A
study of this process in seventeen metropolitan areas, made in the 1960s
by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, has shown
that on the average, the construction of one new unit makes it possible
for a succession of 3.5 moves to occur to different, and more likely
better, housing accommodations. 127 New construction thus benefits more
people indirectly than it does directly-2.5 moves to existing housing
and only one move to new housing.
The filtering concept revolves around the idea that as affluent people
move into better housing, they leave behind residences that are then
occupied by people of lesser financial means.
The Michigan survey shows that for every 1000 new housing units
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 282. The author of this Article was a member of the Commission,
serving as Chairman of the Regulations Committee. According to Reagan's commission:
[M]any controls relating to use and development of housing should continue.
Only municipalities are able to plan and build streets, parks, public buildings,
schools, storm and sanitary sewers, and water mains. Municipalities must also
secure the public's vital and pressing interests, which [Reagan's] commission
identified broadly as limited to protecting health and safety, remedying unique
environmental problems, preserving historical resources, and protecting
investments in existing public infrastructure resources. More specifically,
"vital and pressing governmental interest" includes requiring adequate sanitary
sewer and water services and flood protection; assuring that topographic
conditions will permit safe construction and accommodate septic tank
effluents; protecting drinking water aquifers; avoiding nuisance or obnoxious
uses; requiring off-street parking; prohibiting residential construction amid
industrial development; and avoiding long-term damage to the vitality of
historically established neighborhoods.
Id. at 82-83.
127. JOHN B. LANSING ET AL., NEW HOMES AND POOR PEOPLE: A STUDY OF CHAINS
OF MovEs 65-66 (1969).
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built, there are over 3500 relocations.'2

Of these 3500 relocations, an

average of 333 are by families defined as poor, and 933 are by moderateincome facilities. 129 Thus, more than one-third of all those who move
are likely to be in the lower- and moderate-income categories. While
most construction occurs in the outer portions of the metropolitan area,

these moves extend to older areas near the center of the city. 30 The

nation's worst environmental conditions exist in these areas, and

conditions will further deteriorate if filtering is reduced. In the United
States, the housing subsidy programs have not done much to alleviate
these problems, and improvement necessitates greater housing supply in
the private market. For the government to elevate the living standards of
just 1000 families would require enormous expenditures.'
Those of middle income who are ineligible for subsidized housing and
who cannot afford new housing are similarly dependent for better
housing on the filtering process induced by new construction. "The

University of Michigan survey makes it clear that prohibiting new
construction seriously 32harms the groups that are in need of a better

housing environment."'
Portland's consensus about the virtues of smart growth apparently
does not extend to the population of the state. On the Oregon State
ballot submitted to the voters on November 7, 2000, there appeared
Initiative Measure 7, which required that the state or local government

pay a property owner if a law or regulation reduced the value of his
property.

128.

129.
130.
131.

133

The measure required that the owner be paid just compensation

lId at 66.
LANSING Er At., supra note

127, at 41, 68.

Id at 19, 20.
I am told by builders that in 1989, the cost of construction of a 1000 square-

foot, moderately equipped apartment in San Diego was about S50,000. Accordingly,
construction of 1000 new units would cost $50 million, plus land (which could be priced
at $20,000 to $40,000 per unit in low- and moderate-income areas). Some localities
have sought to provide lower cost housing by requiring developers to set aside portions
of their developments (from ten to twenty percent) for this purpose. Among other things,
such requirements erode development feasibility, thereby limiting production of housing.
For an analysis of such zoning restrictions-usually referred to as "inclusionary
zoning"---see Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, in RESOLVING
THE HOUSING CRISIS: GovERNNiENT PoucY DECONROL AND THE PUBLIC INtlRisT 135
(B.Johnson ed., 1982) [hereinafter RESOLVING THE HOUSING CRISIS]. Portland has not
adopted such legislation.
132. Siegan, supra note 123, at 293.
133. League of Or. Cities v. Oregon. No. 00C20156, slip op. at 10 (Or. Cir. CI. Feb.
22,2001).

equal to the reduction in the fair market value of the property. It applied
only prospectively to regulations enforced or applied to the current
owner of the property. Despite its devastating impact on smart growth
localities and the estimates of huge costs to the state and local
governments, the measure was adopted by a vote of 54% to 46%. 134
Among smart growth's strongest proponents are "new urbanist"
planners who seek to replace sprawl with "neighborhoods of housing,
parks and schools placed within walking distance of shops, civic
services, jobs, and transit-a modem version of the traditional town."' 315
New urbanists also urge changing subdivision requirements to authorize
such development. In contrast to the prevailing zoning practices, the
new urbanists advocate high densities, small lots, and mixed uses. They
seek to reduce use of the automobile by replacing it with public
transportation. When such planning becomes regulations enforceable by
law, these regulations far exceed the force and effect of conventional
zoning regulations, which are intended to secure and protect private
property. New urbanist designs may be quite acceptable for private
developments, but imposing a particular lifestyle is hardly an objective
of public land use regulation. As the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in
the Euclid case, which ruled that zoning was constitutionally valid, the
constitutional justification for regulating the use of land is that it will
protect and preserve private property. 36 Land use planning and
regulation should not be subordinate to highly subjective policies
relating to the lifestyle of people-where and how they should live.
Smart growth and new urbanist planning confront inherent problems
in serving the public, as follows:
(1) Smart growth is a plan that has attracted considerable national
support. However, its permanence and longevity are uncertain. Law
professors Ellickson and Been explain that schools of planning theory
"have tended to rise and ebb within a period of no more than a decade or
so., 137 In the period from 1890 to 1989, it was possible to identify a
number of periods in the history of planning, including The City
Beautiful (1901-1915), The City Functional (1916-1939), The City
Renewable (1937-1964) and The City Enterprising (1980-1989). 138
Contemporary land use experience illustrates the limited durability of
134. It was later struck down by an appeals court for technical reasons relating to
constitutional amendments. Id. at 20-22. The initiative's proponents intend to appeal to
the Oregon Supreme Court.
135. Griffith, supra note 116, at 568.
136. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
137. ROBERT C. ELLIcKSON & VIcKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CoNTRoLs 64 (2d Ed.,

2000).

138. Id. (citing Peter Hall, The Turbulent Eight Decades, 55 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N
275 (1989)).
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land use planning. Until smart growth arrived, land use planners and
regulators accorded single-family development the highest priority of
any land use. In the Euclid case, the U.S. Supreme Court described the
many harms that result from mixing single- and multiple-family housing
("very often the apartment house is a mere parasite" in a single-family
development), 3 9 a position planners and regulators have long observed
and which the smart growth advocates now decry.
(2) No matter how gifted the creators and planners, a plan represents
only the current wisdom of the creators and supporters, who are
necessarily limited by their own knowledge and experience. There are
always others who possess different knowledge and experience and
advocate a different solution. Accordingly, writes John Rahenkamp,
"Our long-term projections are grossly out of line every time. The best
we can work with is something approximating three to five years. At
best we can simulate within brackets."' 4 Economist, Friedrich Hayek,
writes that the best means for obtaining a plan or plans is the competition of
the marketplace.
There would be no difficulty about efficient control or planning were conditions
so simple that a single person or board could effectively survey all the relevant
facts. It is only as the factors which have to be taken into account become so
numerous that it is impossible to14 1gain a synoptic view of them that
decentralization becomes imperative.

In a particular situation, selecting the "best" development plan is very
subjective. Different developers will choose different options. A
locality that only protects against serious harms (nuisances and uses that
are grave threats to person and property) offers the greatest opportunities
for providing innovative solutions for housing and other land uses.
(3) Public land use planning means or implies an orderly, rational
arrangement of land uses directed by experts in planning. Although this
definition raises many questions, it seems to represent what most people
think of when they speak or write of planning. The assumption seems to
be that there is something precise, measurable, or quantitative about
planning, or its standards.

139. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394.
140. ELuCKSON & BEEN, supra note 137, at 77 (citing John Rahenkamp. Land Use
Management: An Alternative to Controls, in FuTURE LAND USE 191-92 (Robert W.
Burchell et al. eds. 1975)).
141. Id.at 80 (citing FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDO.t 36, 48-50
(1944).

This assumption is exceedingly difficult to substantiate, and few of
even its most ardent proponents make the effort. Is there some precise
measurement available to determine the "best" use of some or all of the
land, of growth and antigrowth proposals, and whether the land is better
suited for trees, industry, or the housing of people? Where should the
urban growth boundary be located? Should the land be developed with
two, eight, or twelve housing units to the acre, or is it better suited for a
mobile home park or shopping center or, should it be retained as open
space?
By now, after eighty years of zoning experience in the United States, it
should be clear that there are respectable, distinguished, and knowledgeable
planners who would disagree in many, if not most, instances to any or all
of these alternatives. Planning is unquestionably highly subjective,
lacking those standards
and measurements that are requisites of a
42
scientific discipline. 1
Planners confront serious problems in evaluating the present and
forecasting the future, whether on a micro or a macro level. With
respect to zoning, overruling market-based decisions on land use would
seem to require adherence to special goals or values, or perhaps
experience and understandings that relatively few possess. Zoning
experience is replete with instances in which planners classified land
either to allow uses unacceptable in the market or to deny uses eagerly
sought in the market. Theory and education alone cannot substitute for
the actual experience of making practical decisions and suffering their
consequences. Few planners have ever been part of the construction or
development industry, nor have they been responsible for decisions on
the location and development of residential, commercial, or industrial
projects. Even if they once had been, their information about prices,
materials innovations, trends, and consumer desires and preferences
must now necessarily come from secondary or more remote sources, not
directly from the "firing line."
How, then, can planners possibly be as familiar with the location,
development, construction, and operation of shopping centers, housing
developments, nursing homes, or mobile parks as those who develop,
own, and operate them? Owners and their mortgage lenders risk
substantial funds on their success. Master planning will inevitably
142. This author once practiced law in Illinois. In every major zoning case in which
the author was involved or of which he had knowledge, each side of the controversy was
able to hire a professional planner to testify in support of its position. Some of the cases
were basically verbal duels between planners with opposing views. For further
discussion about land use planning, see CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLr.
LAND-USE PLANNING 45-87 (4th ed. 1989); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT
ZONING 4-9 (1972).
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forbid developers to build where they want, and will permit them to
build where they do not want.
Constitutional restraints relating to smart growth were discussed in a
prior section. The reader is now invited to consider related constitutional
concerns that were presented by the land use controls imposed by
Petaluma, California to stem urban sprawl.
In 1974, a federal district court in California adjudicated Petaluma's
controls and ruled that they violated the right to travel. 43 Among other
regulations, the city imposed an "urban extension line" around the city,
to serve as a boundary for urban expansion.' 44 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed this decision on the basis of existing law which then,
according to the appeals court, empowered a municipality to control land
use for the purpose of preserving its small town character. 45 Since that
date, the U.S. Supreme Court has considerably reduced the deference
accorded localities in land use matters, and increased protection
accorded property rights.' 46 The district court's opinion is accordingly
worthy of consideration.
Projections made in 1962 on the basis of its growth rate indicated that
by 1985, Petaluma's population would be 77,000.47 In an effort to
reduce that number to 55,000, the city in 1971 adopted a series of
regulations for the five-year period, which imposed an urban extension
line and a maximum ceiling of 2,500 dwelling units for the five-year
period.148 Building permits were to be allotted at the rate of approximately
500 per year during that period. 49 The district court found that the plan
would prevent the construction of about one-half to two-thirds of the
market demand for housing units in the city.'50 It held that Petaluma, by
limiting the number of people who could live there, had restricted the
right of citizens to migrate and settle in places of their own choosing.' 5'
The California opinion relied in large measure on decisions of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which declared unconstitutional
143.

Constr. Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D.

Cal. 1974).
144.

145.
1975).
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 576.

Constr. Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
See discussion supra Part III.
Constr.Indus. Ass'n of Sononia Cottn, 375 F. Supp. at 575.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 576-77.

150. Id. at 576.
151. Id. at 581.

ordinances that establish certain minimum lot sizes or do not permit
apartment zoning. 152 The Pennsylvania court ruled such restrictions
exclusionary and therefore unconstitutional. 153 It did not refer to the
right to travel in these decisions, but the California district court
concluded that the underlying rationale of those cases is consistent with
this right.
The plaintiffs do not challenge the legitimacy of [Petaluma's] desire to deal
with the problems of population growth but contend that the means which they
have employed to accomplish their ends fall far short of constitutional validity.
In essence, the plaintiffs contend that the questions where a person should live
is one within the exclusive realm of that individual's prerogative, not within the
decision-making power of any governmental unit. Since Petaluma has assumed
the power to make such decisions on the individual's behalf, it is contended that
the city has violated
the people's right to travel. Considering the facts of the
54
case, we agree. 1

To support the position that Petaluma had violated the right to travel,
the district court cited three Pennsylvania land use decisions, whose
reasoning it adopted
as its own view of the law under the federal
55

Constitution.

In National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 156 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that Easttown Township's ordinance that imposed a
four-acre minimum 57lot requirement was unconstitutional under the
state's constitution.1
The oft repeated... limitation upon the exercise of the zoning power requires
that zoning ordinances be enacted for the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the community. Such ordinances must bear a substantial relationship
to those police power purposes. Regulations adopted
pursuant to that power
58
must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or confiscatory.1

The court queried whether the township's asserted purposes actually
were for the health, safety, morals or general welfare, and if so, whether
the township's means actually achieved those purposes."
The township asserted that the purposes of the ordinance were (1) to
protect its water supply from sewage and other pollution, (2) to prevent
more road congestion, and (3) to preserve the township's historic
character, and (4), to preserve the township's rural character. The court
found that the township did not face a threat to its water supply since it
152. Id. at 584-86 (citing Bilbar Constr. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 851 (Pa.
1958); Nat'l Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1966); Appeal of KitMac Builders, 268 A.2d 765).
153. Id. at 586 (citing Nat'l Land & Investment Co., 215 A.2d 597, 612 (Pa. 1966)).
154. Constr.Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County, 375 F. Supp. at 581.
155. Id. at 584-86.
156. 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965).
157. Id. at 615.
158. Id. at 607 (citations omitted).
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could obtain more of it. 159
With respect to the second asserted purpose, the court concluded that
due to the township's growing population, road congestion could be a
However, the zoning ordinance was an
problem in the future. 6
improper means to remedy whatever road congestion may take place in
the future. The court stated:
Zoning is a tool in the hands of governmental bodies which enables them to
more effectively meet the demands of evolving and growing communities. It
must not and cannot be used by those officials as an instrument by which they
may shirk their responsibilities. Zoning is a means by which a governmental
body can plan for the future - it may not be used as a means to deny the future.
The evidence... indicates that for the present and the immediate future the road
system ...is adequate to handle the traffic load. It is also quite convincing that
the roads will become increasingly inadequate as time goes by and that
improvements and additions will eventually have to be made. Zoning
and
provisions may not be used, however, to avoid the increased responsibilities
161
economic burdens which time and natural growth invariably bring.

With respect to the closely related third and fourth purposes, (historic
and rural character), the court found that preservation of "historic
character" does not rise to the level of "public welfare."' 162 "There is no
doubt that many residents of this area are highly desirous of keeping it
the way it is... . These desires, however, do not rise to the level of
public welfare. This is purely a matter of private desire which zoning
regulations may not be employed to effectuate."'

63

6

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders'
held that the township's ordinance imposing minimum lot requirements
was unconstitutional. Under the township's ordinance, lots along
existing roads and those in the interior must be at least two acres and
three acres, respectively. 65 The court concluded the ordinance was
unconstitutional because its purpose was to exclude potential residents.66
Like the municipality in National Land & Investment Co., the
township in Kit-Mar Builders asserted that its primary purposes for the
ordinance were to prevent a sewerage problem. 67 Without addressing
159.

Nat'l Land & Investment Co., 215 A.2d at 608-12.

160.

Id.
at 610.

161.

Id
Id. at 611.

162.
163.
164.

ld.
Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 268 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1970).

165.

ld.at 765-66.

166.

ld.
at 768 n.6.

167.

Kit-Mar Builders, 268 P.2d at 767.

the second asserted purpose, the court concluded that there are
alternative methods of dealing with sewerage problems. 68 The court
reaffirmed National Land & Investment Co., concluding that the
township's purpose behind the ordinance was to keep out people, which
makes it an impermissible purpose. Further, reaffinring National Land &
Investment Co., the court held the township must deal with the problems
of population growth, and not insulate itself by zoning out population
growth. 169
In Appeal of Girsh, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Nether
Providence Township's zoning ordinance, permitting construction of singlefamily dwellings, was unconstitutional because it did not explicitly provide
for apartments. 170 The ordinance allowed single-family dwellings in the
relevant area but remained silent with regard to apartments. The court
concluded the ordinance's silence was tantamount to an express prohibition
of the building of apartments.17'
The township argued that the ordinance failed to expressly provide for
apartments because apartment living brings added road congestion. The
court concluded that this purpose was to prevent the entrance of
newcomers in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise.
Reaffirming National Land & Investment Co., the court stated, "Zoning
provisions may not be used ...to avoid the increased responsibilities
and economic
burdens which time and natural growth invariably
, 172
bring."
Thus, the court applied the same heightened scrutiny it did in National
Land & Investment Co.; it independently queried the validity of the
purpose and found it impermissible. Also, the court showed the same
concern for zoning provisions used by a municipality to shield itself
from the inevitable effects (people moving
around and looking for new
173
places to live) of population growth.
The district court in Petaluma found the reasoning of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court persuasive and sound and held that a zoning ordinance
"which has at its purpose the exclusion of additional residents in any
degree is not a compelling
governmental interest, nor it is one within the
174
public welfare."'

Petaluma claimed that several compelling state interests existed
168. Id. at 768.
169. Kit-Mar Builders, 268 A.2d at 768-69.
170. Appeal of Girsh, 263 A.2d 395, 396 (Pa. 1970).
171. Id. at 397.
172. Id. at 398 (quoting Nat'l Land & Inv. Co., 215 A.2d 597, 610 (Pa. 1965)).
173. Id.
174. Constr. Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 586
(N.D. Cal. 1994).
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supporting its exclusionary growth plan. It asserted that its sewer and
water facilities were inadequate to serve an ever increasing population
and it was entitled to preserve its character as a small town community.
In reply to the sewer and water concerns, the court stated as follows:
"Where a municipality purposefully limits the quantity of any particular
commodity available, then seeks to justify a population limitation based
upon an alleged inadequacy of that commodity,17 it has not stated a
compelling interest which supports the limitation."' -1
With respect to Petaluma's maintaining its small town character, the
court quoted from Edwards v. California:
It is frequently the case that a State might seek a momentary respite from the
pressure of events by the simple expedient of shutting its gates to the outside
world. But, in the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo: "The Constitution %asframed
under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was
framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together,176
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not

division.

The Petaluma court, as well as the Pennsylvania cases which it cited,
did not distinguish between interstate and intrastate travelers, upholding
the right of travel to all who sought to settle in the jurisdiction involved
in the litigation.
V. INTRASTATE TRAVEL

Inasmuch as the right to travel is a fundamental right, this right is

violated when government regulations restrict travel from one state to
another as well as when a state restricts travel within the state. For a
traveler, it makes little difference whether his journey is across the
borders of a state or within its borders. The travel cases decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court emphasize the fundamental character of this right
and do not assert that it exists solely to protect interstate travelers.
The Court has not ruled on the question whether an exclusionary
ordinance applicable solely to intrastate travel would violate the right to
travel. But it has suggested this outcome. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County177 involved a requirement of a one-year residency in a county as
a condition to receiving nonemergency hospitalization or medical care at
175.

Id at 583.

176. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941) (quoting Baldwin v.
Seelig, 294 U.S. 523 (1935)).
177.

Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).

public expense. In invalidating this requirement, the Court observed that
an ordinance which discriminated only against intrastate travelers would
be internally inconsistent, as intrastate travelers (or longtime residents
from neighboring counties) would have greater ties to a community in
their own state than interstate travelers or persons from out of state. 78
The Court found that because it penalized the right of intrastate travel it
also impinged on the right of interstate travel and that the denial of
79
nonemergency medical care had the possibility of deterring migration.1
Two federal circuit courts have protected rights of intrastate travelers.
In Cole v. Housing Authority,180 the plaintiffs were residents of Rhode
Island and sought admission to a federally assisted public housing
project in Newport, a city in that state.1 81 One had migrated to Newport
from another state and the other from a location within Rhode Island.
However, the housing project required two years residency in Newport
in order to obtain access to it.1 82 The First Circuit Court of Appeals
found that Shapiro's concept of "travel" for the purpose of the
constitutionally protected "right to travel" meant that a person migrating
to a particular location with the intention to stay there cannot be treated
differently from existing residents. Because plaintiffs intended to stay in
Newport, the court
found that Newport's housing program violated their
83
right to travel.
The facts and outcome were similar in King v. New Rochelle
Municipal Housing Authority'84 (decided by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals), which explained that the use of the term "interstate travel" in
Shapiro reflected the statewide enactments involved in that case. 8 5 It
would be "meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a
fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to8 6acknowledge a
correlative constitutional right to travel within a state."
VI. ZONING

Smart growth (as practiced in Portland) is a form of zoning, or land
use control, which was first implemented in this country with the passage
of the New York Zoning Law of 1916. Almost all municipalities have
since adopted zoning. It is said that zoning is accepted-as an essential
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 256 n.9.
Id. at 257.
435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).

181.

Id. at 808.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 808-09.
Id. at 813.
442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971).
Id. at 648.
Id.
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requirement of urban life-by the vast majority of American cities.
However, while zoning exists almost everywhere, it is invariably found
wanting and zoning codes are continually revised; smart growth is the
latest and most extreme example. "Consider the history of zoning.
Area-wide land use controls arrived in this nation in 1916 in the form of
the New York Zoning Resolution, the country's first zoning
ordinance."' 187 Compared to smart growth, the 1916 New York zoning
ordinance was merely a ripple on the landscape. "This modest ordinance
contained three use districts (residential, commercial and unrestricted),
At
five classes of height districts; and three classes of area districts."''
my last count, New York City had about seventy zoning districts and a
host of other controls never contemplated by the framers of its original
ordinance. Under current ordinances, the zoning authorities in that city
design, building materials,
frequently have power to determine building
9
the land plan and even sales prices. 1
The story is now a familiar one. Small, modest zoning ordinances
grow into very complex and complicated ones. The reason is, of course,
the change in conditions, techniques and thinking that occurs over the
years and is reflected in our laws. But there are two other explanations
for the uncontrolled growth of zoning. The first is that zoning has been
the story of unrealized expectations. It simply does not work as represented.
To date, we have had six or seven different zoning strategies in this
90
country, and new ones (such as smart growth) continue to evolve.
Each has been introduced with what has turned out to be greatly inflated
rhetoric as to what it would accomplish.
Each zoning strategy, in turn, has for the most part failed to meet the
expectations created by that rhetoric. The result, every time, is a new
effort at the drawing boards, producing more and new rules and regulations
that, experience suggests, are not likely to be more successful than the
previous one.
Another reason for the proliferation of zoning regulations is that the
process is basically one of resolving differences among various special
interest groups in the community. No matter how perfect a zoning plan,
it will help some people and hurt others. Soon after passage of the
ordinance, the losers, experience shows, start doing those things that will
187.
188.
189.
190.

SIrGAN,

supra note 1, at 188.

d.
Id.at 189.
See id.

make them winners. Landowners will seek to rezone their property to
increase its value. Homeowners and environmentalists insist that the
rules be more stringent and exclusionary, and civic groups will move to
make their reforms "in the general public interest." Boundary lines
separating uses, such as the UGB in Portland, become pawns in the
struggles between factions. The courts may also affect significant changes.
When the location of a boundary line accounts for vast differences in
value, the lobbying for position is exceedingly intense.
Consider the reaction to the New York Zoning law of 1916, the
nation's first zoning ordinance, as described by Seymour I. Toll in his
book Zoned American:
The most unusual thing about the new law was the passionate optimism
with which it was received, not only locally, but throughout the nation. This
spirit swept far beyond the young planning profession and the business
community. McAneny [President of the Board of Aldermen] called the law "the
greatest single achievement in city planning in America," and "the greatest
thing New York City... has ever done..." For World's Work it opened "a
new era in urban civilization." Outlook hailed it as "one of the most progressive
and forward-looking steps for the protection of its future development that has
been made by any American city." Veiller, the hard bitten, rather cynical
reformer, said: "The situation as I see it is the most hopeful one the city
planning group has ever had to face. I repeat, we are standing on the edge of a
great change in living conditions in America. We are going to revolutionize
conditions in a generation..."
The intoxicating promise of a long leap along the high road of progress
often turns into something else once the details begin to close in. It is one thing
to forecast the New Jerusalem, another to lay bricks. The 1916 Report found
the
golden prospect of a finer urban life riddled with practical, utopia-denying
complications. 191

Proponents of smart growth have also been enthusiastic; the prospects
for its success are probably not much greater than those for more
conventional zoning restraints. Indeed, it may suffer an untimely
constitutional death at the hands of the judiciary. When the U.S.
Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 192 held zoning
to be constitutional in 1926, the reaction from municipal officials and
planners was very enthusiastic. Zoning, they said, will save Euclid from
being gobbled up by Cleveland. By contrast, the current mayor of
Euclid is highly critical of the process, as described in the December
2000 issue of the ABA Journal:
Nearly 75 years later, the small town that won the big battle over local
zoning power now seeks greater regional cooperation in land use and
development policies. Rather than fighting economic encroachment from
Cleveland, Euclid, now an inner-ring suburb, has joined the city and nearby

19 1. TOLL, supra note 8,at 181 (citations omitted).
192. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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towns to fight sprawl from outer-belt suburbs.

In an ironic twist, Euclid Mayor Paul Oyaski sees the independent
zoning authorities of some 60 local governments in Cuyahoga County as
adding to the problem.
"Redistributing wealth, property values and population to newer, undeveloped
areas, which is the essence of urban sprawl, serves to benefit not the public at
large but the real estate developers and speculators and tie politicians they
support ......
"Who benefits from building new communities, new hospitals, new schools.
new infrastructure while abandoning similar facilities near the city!' OQaski
asked. "Communities and neighborhoods are not disposable commodities, to be
discarded at will.
Rebuilding, renovating, and reinvesting in existing
neighborhoods is a better policy."1 94

The popularity of smart growth among planners reveals the failures of
conventional zoning. As has happened many times in the past, the
existing zoning system has been found wanting, and the hopes and
aspirations of the planning community have now turned to a new
Valhalla. The problem is that the planners cannot accept the reality of
the private market. They continue to assume that planning and
regulation will triumph over freedom. World history, in general, and
Houston, in particular, disclose the vacuity of that position.

VII. THE PRIVATE MARKET HAS THE SMARTEST
GROWTH CONTROLS
Development of the United States occurred over the years as cities and
towns sprung up either by chance or design over vast and unoccupied
territory. Cities were organized initially and those not satisfied settled
outside of existing boundaries. A large percentage of this country's
population live in localities created by urban sprawl, that is, in small
cities, towns and villages. Living outside of cities has advantages and
disadvantages, but until recently it has never been thought to be
antisocial. Prior to zoning, normal market forces were largely responsible
for urban sprawl. Zoning imposed regulations limiting use, density, area
and height, considerably reducing available land, and causing much
greater sprawl than existed previous to its imposition.
The United States successfully developed in its early years because of

193.
194.

William C. Smith, The Brawl Over Sprawl, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2000. at 48.
Id.

man's "overwhelming dynamic,] ... the lust to own land.' ' 95 "[Flor
the first time in human history," writes historian Paul Johnson, "cheap,
good land was available to the multitude." 196 The availability of land
enabled the colonists to achieve a level of prosperity and contentment
not readily available in the countries from which they migrated. The
colonists achieved great commercial success because there was little
restraint on the use of land.
The story in modem times is far different. While the freedoms of
ownership and production have enormously benefited most people in the
United States, these freedoms are presently under attack because it is
alleged that the land is being wasted, that is, too much of it is being used
for urban purposes. There is no land crisis, nor can there be one when
no more than six percent of the total land area of the United States is
devoted to these uses. What makes the purported crisis very perplexing
is that the people who demand reform of land use policies are those most
responsible for its excesses. The amount of land used for urban purposes
is determined both by the private market and by government regulation.
It is inevitable that the ordinary and benign practices of the private
market will not always lead to consecutive development. There will
invariably be gaps between private developments for the reasons previously
stated. It would require a massive coercive effort to change these
practices. The theorists of smart growth recognize that the enormous
amount of regulation the land use community imposed on the private
market is responsible for the problems of land and energy wastage they
criticize.
The private market is not devoid of "smart growth" controls. Consider
land development in unzoned Houston. 197 No large-lot or snob zoning
exists there because the builders and developers determine the size of
most building lots, not the planners and politicians. There are very few
regulatory curbs limiting density and height of multiple-family housing
or of shopping centers and other commercial stores in central or other
areas. No laws prohibit erection of buildings containing both residential
and commercial uses. Nor does Houston have growth controls, which
cause builders to by-pass restricted areas in order to build further out in
less restricted areas. No regulations prohibit builders from erecting
"new urbanist" traditional town housing near jobs, schools, parks, shops,
civil services and transit.
Despite the absence of location controls, most multiple-family
structures have been erected in the southwest portion of Houston, which
195.
196.
197.

PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Id. at 85-86.
See Siegan, supra note 123, at 295.

85 (1997).
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is partially within or readily accessible to downtown. (The reason is
obvious: that's where people choose to live.) The city has a high
population density, greater than Dallas and Phoenix zoned cities, with
which it is often compared. Less land is accordingly devoted to residential
occupancy in Houston than in the two zoned cities. 9 ' Interestingly, a
survey of cities that led in downtown population growth between 1990
and 2000 shows Houston first with a growth of 69% and Portland fifth
with a growth of 35%.199 And, of course, there are no personal attacks
and accusations that often occur at zoning hearings because there are no
such hearings.
Coastal or other environmental regulations in the cities cause
developers to build homes in the suburbs or rural areas. The California
Coastal zone covers land along and within five miles of California's
1100 miles of shoreline. The California Coastal Commission regulates
the use of this land and substantially limits development of it. In my
home city of San Diego, there are so many restrictions on building
structures higher than three stories, both in the coastal areas and
elsewhere, that terminating development in the suburbs will greatly
reduce the total amount of developable land in the region. San Diego is
not about to accommodate smart growth by removing height and density
requirements.
The Houston system of land use controls, which relies principally on
economic controls and on relatively few regulations, presents an
alternative to zoning and smart growth. I will discuss and explain
Houston's system in the next section of this Article. My purpose is not
to advocate repeal of current land use regulations and substitute Houston's
system. That would be entirely unrealistic. Zoning is not about to disappear.
However, Houston offers a market approach to achieving the goals of
smart growth. As Professor Staley put it, "by attempting to work with
198. As part of his requirements for obtaining a B.A. degree in Economics at
Dartmouth College, Kihara Rufus Kiarie submitted a dissertation on "The Effects of the
Lack of Zoning on Urban Structure in Houston." Kihara Rufus Kiarie, The Effects of

the Lack of Zoning on Urban Structure in Houston (1996) (unpublished B.A. thesis.
Dartmouth College) (on file with author). Among other things, he compared Houston's
density with that of Dallas, Phoenix and Tampa. He found that Houston had greater
density than Dallas and Phoenix and slightly less than Tampa. However, Tampa was not
comparable because it lies on Tampa Bay. Areas constricted by water have a higher
population density because of the lack of land for urban use. However, the difference
between Houston and Tampa is much less than between Houston and the other two
cities.
199. Vital Statistics, U.S. NEws & WORLD RE., May 21, 2001, at 13.

the dynamic nature of the real estate market, planning can be retooled"
to achieve the benefits of the private market. 20° In our country, freedom
is always to be preferred over regulations, both for ideological and
pragmatic reasons. This concern is especially important when lawmaking
bodies consider imposition of smart growth controls (on mobility and
private property) which threaten to eviscerate basic freedoms of the people.
The nation owes its great political and economic successes to freedom and
not to regulation.
I agree with smart growthers who consider zoning dumb, but I do so
for different reasons. Let me elaborate by again discussing the most
famous of all zoning cases, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
decided in 1926, which held zoning constitutionally valid.20 1 The
property involved in that case consisted of sixty-eight areas owned by
the Ambler Realty Company in the Cleveland suburb of Euclid.2 2 This
acreage fronted on Euclid Avenue, a major thoroughfare. The ordinance
set forth rules that indirectly established prices for vacant land.20 3 Thus,
Euclid's zoning ordinance classified the property adjoining Euclid
20 4
Avenue as U-2, permitting only single- and two-family dwellings.
The Ambler Company asserted that in the absence of zoning, the land in
question had a value of $10,000 Ter acre and would be used for
industrial and commercial purposes.2°5 However, under the U-2 zoning
classification, its value was only $2500 per acre.20 6 Despite Ambler's
complaint that the zoning confiscated most of the value of its land, the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the zoning classification as a reasonable
exercise of legislative power. 207 The Court's theory seemed to be that
public control of land use would better serve society than market control
of land use.
This position is devoid of merit. Ignoring the difference between the
political and market prices eliminates this most vital factor for satisfying
the people's wants and desires. The fact that the property was worth
$10,000 per acre if it could be used for commercial and industrial
purposes reflected a substantial demand in the area for the erection of
such structures. In other words, measured by dollars there was a greater
need in the area for stores, offices and light industrial plants than for
houses and apartments. By denying Ambler's request for a ruling that
200. Samuel R. Staley, Reforming the Zoning Laws, in A GUIDE TO SMART GROWTH
75 (Jane S. Shaw et al. eds., 2000).
201. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-97 (1926).
202. Id. at 379.
203. Id. at 384.
204. Id. at 382.
205. Id. at 384.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 397.
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would allow the land to be used for such purposes, the Court in effect
rejected the best measurement of community preferences. It also
deprived the community of a mechanism which automatically adjusts to
both supply and demand changes over time. As the commercial
demands are met, the price of the property may decrease, possibly to a
figure lower than offered for residential property. Erecting stores and
plants would also lead to more employment and availability of goods
and services probably raising the demand for housing. Because it is
governed by the political process, zoning is far less resilient to economic
changes.
To be sure, many in the land use community applaud the Euclid decision
because they likewise advocate local control of land use. Included in
this group are the new urbanist-smart growth proponents who uphold
local majority rule as implementing democratic rule. They apparently
assume that their planning objectives will be accepted and approved by
local majorities. This may occur, but clearly it is not inevitable. The
U.S. Constitution is not similarly confident of the wisdom or virtue of
majorities. The most important Framer of the U.S. Constitution and Bill
of Rights was James Madison, who in time was elected fourth President
of the United States. According to Madison, a just and viable state can
only exist when government is structured to reconcile and benefit from
the various interests and tensions that exist among its citizens.2 3
Madison and other Framers of our Constitution rejected the rule of the
majorities and designed the government to limit and distribute power
among three branches of government: the legislative, executive and
'''
judicial. "Madison rejected majority rule as a matter of principle."
"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary,
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny." 210 "In fact, it is only re-establishing, under another name
and more specious form, force as a matter of right." 2 1' In a letter to
Thomas Jefferson, he asserted that the invasion of private rights is
chiefly to be apprehended "from acts in which the Government is the
208. James Madison, Vices of the PoliticalSystem of the United States. April 1787,
in THE FOuNDERS' CONsTrnrnON 166, 168-69 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer, eds.
1987).
209. SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 53.
210. TIEFEDERAUSTNO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961).
211. SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 53 n.29 (quoting THE FORGIING OF ANtNICAN
FEDERALiSM: SELECTED VRrNGS OFJAMES MADISON 45 (Saul K. Padover ed.. 1965)).

mere instrument of the major number of constituents. 2 12
According the legislature unlimited power, Madison wrote, violated a
fundamental principle of a free society:
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.
With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges
and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of
legislation but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights
of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And
what are the different21classes
of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes
3
which they determine?

American zoning experience reveals the problems inherent in
according local residents and their legislatures full control over land use
in their communities. Residents tend to use this power to exclude people
or groups they consider undesirable from their communities. Those
excluded are otherwise ready, willing and able to move into the
communities. Three presidential commissions have concluded that local
exclusionary land use policies were a major barrier to a greater and fairer
distribution of housing in the nation.2 1 4 Existing residents acting in their
own self-interest imposed regulatory obstacles, excluding persons they
did not like or believed threatened their life style. It is, of course,
questionable that the goals of smart growth will necessarily be in accord
with the local electorate. As I have previously reported in Part II, city
residents are not likely to welcome high density development in their
areas. In view of the current zoning rules, the goals of smart growth will
largely succumb to existing zoning practices that smart growthers
deplore. Local land use authorities will instead apply smart growth to
make land use more exclusionary than ever. Smart growth will be used
to justify nongrowth in suburban and rural areas, and minimal growth in
city areas.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Euclid case transferred control of
land use in this country to a group of planners and politicians not suited
to this enormous responsibility. (This is not a criticism of them, but a
conclusion about the enormity of the task they assume.) Because land
planning is not a scientific discipline, its practitioners vary greatly in
their recommendations for land use.
Thus, in the Euclid case, most planners and developers would not
restrict land on Euclid Avenue, a major thoroughfare, to residential use.
But then, planners have a very limited role in deciding land use. This
212. Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788),
in I BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 616 (1971)).
213. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
214. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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power belongs to the city councils, whose members are experts at
politics but hardly at making land use decisions. Like office holders and
would-be office holders everywhere, they for the most part will do that
which will keep them in office or elevate them to higher office.
Federal Judge Richard Posner has described the operation of the
political process in an article he coauthored with University of Chicago,
Professor William Landes.2 15 They write that in the economists' version
of the interest-group theory of government, "legislation is supplied to
groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers of favorable legislation....
Payments take the form of campaign contributions, votes, implicit
promises of future favors, and sometimes outright bribes. In short,
legislation is 'sold'216by the legislature and 'bought' by the beneficiaries
of the legislation.",
The failings and infirmities of lawmakers were well-known to the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution and caused them to protect individual
liberties by separating and substantially limiting the powers of
government. Madison was concerned about the frailties of legislative
bodies which he observed as a member for three years of the Virginia
House of Delegates.21 7 Far from being dedicated to the public good, he
believed most of the legislators were pursuing their own political or
public office to achieve
financial interests.21 8 He wrote that men 2seek
19
ambition, personal interest, or public good.
Unhappily, the two first are proved by experience to be most prevalent. Hence
the candidates who feel them, particularly, the second, are most industrious, and
most successful in pursuing their object; and forming often a majority in the
legislative Councils, with interested views, contrary to the interest, and views of
their Constituents, join in a perfidious sacrifice of the latter to the former. A
succeeding election, it might be supposed, would displace the offenders, and
repair the mischief. But how easily are base and selfish measures, masked by
pretexts of public good and apparent expediency? How frequently will a
repetition of the same arts and industry which succeeded in the first instance
again prevail on the unwary to misplace their confidence?2 0

215. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975).
216. Id. at 877.
217. Madison, supra note 208, at 168-69.
218.
d
219. See id
220. Id.at 168.

VIII. SMART GROWTH IN HOUSTON

By contrast, the economic controls of the marketplace operate quite
rationally and coherently. Consider land use in Houston. In the absence
of zoning, it has relatively few regulations excluding people who want to
settle there. Its land use policies are quite friendly to consumers and
property owners. With a population in 1998 of 1,786,691 persons, it is
the largest city in the south and southwest United States and the fourth
largest in the nation.221 In that year, its area contained 539.9 square
miles.2 22
I have previously set forth the many smart growth benefits that the
land use system in Houston provides. Its economic restraints conserve
land and enable it to be used efficiently and productively. To be sure,
Houston has no urban boundary law, and some may consider its absence
a defect of proper land use regulation. My reply to these critics is that

the Houston system has more than overcome its absence by its
commitment to entry of people and land uses. Very few laws exist that
exclude people or property. A nonzoned city is a cosmopolitan collection
of property uses. The standard is supply and demand. If there is

economic justification for the use, it is likely to be forthcoming. Zoning
restricts the supply of uses, and thereby prevents some demands from
being satisfied. It likewise impedes innovation.22 3 In the absence of
land use regulations, there are many builders in the city fiercely
competing with each other to obtain consumer acceptance.
221. THEWORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OFFACrs 2001 at 376 (William A. McGeveran,
Jr. et al. eds., 2001).
222. Id. at 436.
223. Zoning rules have prohibited the construction of many low cost
accommodations. In Houston, in the late 1960s, rental projects were built in minority
neighborhoods containing sixteen or more detached houses per acre, an unusually high
concentration by prevailing standards. This density was even too much for Houston's
planning department, which sought unsuccessfully to ban them. At the time, singlefamily detached units typically ranged in density in the United States between one and
five units per acre. REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION, THE COSTS OF SPRAWL 65
(1974). The developments in question were being erected in very low income, AfricanAmerican areas by private, unsubsidized investors, a rare occurrence in the United
States. The principal inducement for the developers was the opportunity afforded by the
large density to reduce land and construction costs. These projects offer unusually
inexpensive rental housing, in all likelihood superior to that which the tenants last
occupied. Because Houston imposes no restriction as to size and type of construction,
the market for new houses is very flexible. As mortgage rates rise, for example, the
developer is able to reduce the size of units to limit prices. In many suburbs of Dallas,
on the other hand, where zoning regulates dwelling unit size and type, it is not possible
to construct units below a specified square footage. Texas developers maintain that as a
result they have had to discontinue building in these suburbs, denying many potential
customers an opportunity to purchase housing. See SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 189-98
(comparing the housing prices between unzoned Houston and zoned Dallas).

740
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In this connection, the question often comes up whether nonzoning
has an effect upon racial distribution in Houston. I have done no study
concerning this subject. Interestingly, a recent magazine article contains
information about it. 4 On the basis of a readers' choice survey, Black
Enterprisemagazine, in its July 2001 issue, selected Houston as the best
city in the nation for African-Americans, who number about 25% of its
population. 225 Ten cities were finalists in the survey. The magazine
reveals this information about African-Americans who live in the city:
(1) The city has a low level of segregation, which enables
African-Americans to live throughout the city.
(2) Among the ten finalists, Houston had the second lowest cost
of living index.
(3) The average house price is $108,500, the lowest house price
among the ten cities.
(4) Forty-three percent of African-Americans are homeowners
despite a home mortgage rejection rate of nearly 41%.
(5) There are twenty-nine African-American residents for every
"-6
African-American business, the best ratio in the list of cities.
In the competition for the best city for African-Americans, the ten
leading cities were ranked in the following order: Houston, Washington,
D.C., Atlanta, Charlotte, Memphis, Detroit, Baltimore, Dallas, Chicago,
and Philadelphia. 2 7
The absence of zoning has not made the use of land in Houston
chaotic or disorderly. If such conditions actually existed, Houston's
voters would likely have demanded zoning, not rejected it. The
evidence indicates that various land uses (commercial, residential, and
industrial) on the whole are about as separated in Houston as they would
be under zoning. How has this occurred without zoning controls? The
answer is that Houston does have land-use controls, but these are
primarily economic. The use and development of land and property in
Houston are controlled in three different ways. First, they are controlled
by the normal economic forces of the marketplace; that is, some uses are
acceptable only in certain areas of the city and not in others. Second,
they are controlled through legal agreements, principally restrictive
224. See Monique R. Brown & David A. Padgett, 10 Best Cities for African
Americans, BLACK ENTERPRIsp, July 2001, at 74.
225. Id.at 90.
226. Id.
227. Id at 92.

covenants imposed by developers of subdivisions that specify the
required use characteristics of each lot, and enable every lot-owner to
sue in the event of a violation. The city enforces restrictive covenants that
the private sector has imposed on property. Third, use and development
are controlled through a relatively limited number of land-use ordinances
adopted by the city.
Houston also controls development through subdivision, building,
traffic, nuisance, and housing regulations that do not seem to vary
significantly from those of other cities in its region. But the contrast
with zoning is clear: unless a property is subject to an enforceable
restrictive covenant, the city exercises minimum control over the uses
that will be made of that property.
As I have previously reported, a major benefit of Houston's system of
land use controls is that it keeps housing prices low. Almost all credible
scholarly studies show that growth controls, which are basically strong
zoning restrictions, elevate housing prices.28 The prices go up as the
restraints become more severe. Zoning regulations, by imposing production
and development requirements not related to nuisances, or health and
safety problems, or matters of vital and pressing concern, raise needlessly
the price of housing. z29
The Houston experience demonstrates that in the United States, zoning
schemes regulating land-use separation and density are not essential to
the livability and viability of cities. In the absence of zoning, residential,
commercial, and industrial uses will be abundant and will develop
separately from each other. Certain uses will locate only in certain places.
Gas stations and fast-food franchises, and most other major commercial
developments, provide an obvious illustration: regardless of where they
are permitted, they will locate only on heavily trafficked streets.
"This means that major business and commercial uses generally will
be absent from the residential or local streets which constitute close to
eighty percent of total street mileage within Houston, and probably
about the same elsewhere. 2 30 Covenants and restrictions imposed in
residential areas generally prohibit nonresidential uses.
In areas of Houston no longer subject to restrictive covenants or in which
covenants were never [executed], these local streets contain relatively few
commercial uses, probably no more than five percent within a [subdivision].
The bulk of these are home occupations and businesses that [usually] serve23the
residents of the area, and therefore.... are probably compatible with the area. 1

228.
229.
230.
231.

SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 189.
Id.
Siegan, supra note 123, at 296.
Id.
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There is also a great tendency for industrial uses to group and
concentrate separately from residential uses. This pattern is generally
confirmed by the land use maps of Texas cities that were not zoned in
the 1960s (about when the maps were drawn): Pasadena, Wichita Falls,
Laredo, and Baytown.2 It is generally too costly in terms of land prices
and potential public hostility for heavy industry to locate adjoining new
residential subdivisions. The plants and factories in the Houston area
which are contiguous to and which were erected subsequent to homes
are usually "light' rather than "heavy" in character. Apartment and
condominium development also reflects a pattern of separation. As
previously noted, the vast bulk of multifamily development in Houston
has occurred in the southwest section of the city.
There are substantial areas in and around Houston where there is small
demand for multiple-family, industrial, and commercial development.
These areas provide the land for single-family occupancy. Most singlefamily developers in Houston (as well as in many other parts of the
country before and even after the advent of zoning) have traditionally
imposed restrictive covenants to permit only the erection of houses of
specified characteristics within their subdivisions. Because many of the
earlier restrictive covenants in Houston were limited in duration, legally
insufficient, or not enforced by owners, zoning would probably have
kept more areas exclusively for single families.
Studies have shown that market mechanisms operate to reduce the
impact of uses that are regarded in zoning theory as adverse to property
values. This is evident in Houston, where the price of vacant land
depends in part on the actual or potential use of adjoining land. Thus,
land on the perimeter of a residential subdivision may sell for much less
than that located in the interior if the land adjoining the subdivision is
vacant or used for purposes other than similar residential development.
In a nonzoned market, economic forces operate to reduce or eliminate
adverse economic land development and use.
Most of the covenants in Houston created subsequent to World War 11
are much more durable and seem to offer a reasonably practical solution
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to the conflicting desires of allowing for change yet maintaining stability.
Most post-World War II covenants contain an automatic extension provision.
They provide for an initial duration period of twenty-five to thirty years,
and an indefinite number of ten-year automatic extension periods.
Agreement on the part of fifty-one percent of the owners (usually one
vote per lot or on the basis of frontage) may cancel or amend the
covenants before the end of the initial period or before the end of any
subsequent ten-year period. Under this provision, a majority of homeowners
can control the destiny of their subdivision.
Because enforcement of restrictive covenants can be costly for
homeowners in lower income subdivisions and small subdivisions,
Houston adopted an ordinance in 1965 enabling the city to enforce these
covenants. Houston has also adopted an off-street parking ordinance for
residential development, a limited number of location restrictions (such
as prohibiting sexually oriented businesses, junk yards, and helicopter
pads in or near residential areas), requirements for minimum lot sizes,
minimum densities and building lines, and a relatively small number of
other government regulations designed to cure problems of land use not
satisfactorily controlled by the private market. As elsewhere in the
nation, laws exist to prevent or abate nuisances. The absence of zoning
does not preclude authority of the city to adopt land use or any other
ordinances provided they are within state and federal limitations.
For homeowners, restrictive covenants serve the same purpose of
maintaining exclusivity as does zoning. While similar in this respect,
the covenants otherwise vary greatly from zoning both in application and
operation, and they illustrate the difference between the economic and
political marketplaces in determining land use and development. As
heretofore explained, zoning is controlled by the political system and
principally achieves that which is most important politically. It allows
homeowners to influence zoning of land within an area that is far
removed from their subdivision, and whose development will have little
impact on them.
By contrast, developers or owners, and their lenders, impose
covenants on their subdivisions solely as a means to secure and
maximize their investments. They will apply covenants in accordance
with what they believe are the desires of their prospective purchasers.
Since there is usually no incentive for owners to restrict the use of their
land while it is in a raw state, covenants normally affect little more than
land already developed or programmed for development, and then
largely for homes or townhouses. As a result, probably no more than
twenty-tive percent of the land area of Houston is subject to restrictive
covenants. Under zoning, every square inch of the city's land would be
regulated.

Land Use Controls

[VoL 38: 693, 2001]

S.N DIEGO LAW RMVEW

Restrictive covenants are a device of the market to maximize the value
of property. Most American homeowners prefer to live in a homogeneous
environment, and they should have the freedom to pursue this goal,
provided others are not harmed. Restrictive covenants come close to
achieving this balance. Under the covenants, homeowners cannot
control the use of land that is beyond what they or their neighbors own.
However, zoning allows almost unlimited pursuit of exclusionary
purposes, often with adverse effects upon nonresidents.
Subdivisions in a nonzoned city are separate and independent enclaves
preventing subdivision controversies from becoming city or county
conflicts. A local subdivision controversy can be resolved within a
subdivision without the need for making the issue a city-wide concern
that the city council may have to resolve. For example, the desire of
subdivision owners to ban noisy leaf-blowing machines used for gardening
purposes is largely a matter for decision by these homeowners.
However, in a zoned community, ordinances to prohibit these machines
become issues affecting not only the subdivision residents but also
people who own or are employed in gardening, which, in effect accords
them political power on a par with the subdivision owners.
During the Gore-Bush presidential election, charges were made that
Texas and Houston were lax in enacting antipollution measures. I have
made no evaluation in this Article or elsewhere of these charges. There
is no relation between the existence of zoning and pollution controls.
The state and city have the power to adopt antipollution laws and their
use of this authority is a matter of legislative discretion. Both have
enacted nuisance laws which can be applied to curb pollution.
Human resourcefulness and inventiveness are able to thrive in
Houston because of the absence of their enemy, government regulation.
Unfortunately, in zoned cities, these talents are often spent in persuading
or outmaneuvering the zoning authorities.
IX. CONCLUSION

Many commentators have explored the question of whether zoning
"works" better than nonzoning. The assumption is that a municipality
should adopt the system that is "best." However, the United States
Constitution does not give legislators complete discretion in this regard.
Whatever system they adopt must conform to constitutional requirements.

Dedicated by its preamble to securing the "Blessings of Liberty," 23the
3
Constitution protects the right of ownership in nearly a dozen provisions.
People should be free to live their lives where they wish. This idea
does not prevail in land use regulation. Planners and politicians greatly
influence where people live. The failures of eighty years of land use
planning and regulation do not inspire confidence in their workability or
viability. Our planners and politicians have not learned the lesson of
these many years, and seem increasingly interested in asserting greater
controls over the supply of housing and thereby impeding the attainment
of better shelter for people. Smart growth is the newest example with
also a dim likelihood of success. If land use regulation does not work,
government should impose less of it-surely not more.
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U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9; art 4, § 2; amends. II, III, IV, V, VII, VIII, IX.

